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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have become an increasingly popular 
phenomenon during the past decades. For example, in 2004 alone over 30,000 mergers and 
acquisitions were undertaken globally, with their total value exceeding US$1,900 billion 
(Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006), compared to 10 years before when the aggregate value 
was around US$600 billion (Schoenberg, 2003). 
The reason for the global pervasiveness of M&As is that they provide a relatively quick and 
versatile means to corporate growth and renewal. Firms often use acquisitions in order to 
achieve such diverse strategic goals as, for example, increasing market power, expanding to 
new product markets or geographical territories, or gaining access to valuable resources 
(Schoenberg, 2003). Compared to internal development, acquisitions are a much faster way 
to build these capabilities. 
The popularity of acquisitions is reflected also in the wide interest mergers and acquisitions 
have received within the research community (for a fairly comprehensive review, see e.g. 
Parvinen, 2003). The biggest problem regarding M&As, as identified by a large majority of 
researchers, is that on average their effect on the acquiring firm‟s post-acquisition 
performance ranges from slightly negative to zero (King, Dalton, Daily and Covin, 2004; 
Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 3; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
Likewise, acquiring firms‟ directors are dissatisfied with the performance of around 50% of 
their acquisitions (Schoenberg, 2003). Existing research has been unable to find specific 
factors that improve acquisition performance, although multiple have been proposed. For 
example King et al. (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of the four most common factors 
suggested by earlier research, and found that none of them has a significant effect on post-
acquisition performance. 
These results do not, however, imply that further attempts to explain M&A performance is a 
futile or useless attempt. From a research perspective they actually present an interesting 
dilemma, since the amount of acquisitions continues to increase despite their obvious 
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challenges and lack of observed benefits. It is insufficient to state only that the average post-
acquisition performance gain is zero, since “this mean hides a large variance in acquirer 
gains” (Capron and Pistre, 2002: 781). Interestingly, for example, if only the worst 
performing 2% of all acquisitions undertaken between 1998 and 2001 are excluded, the 
aggregate shareholder returns during this time are positive (Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Schultz, 2005). This indicates that there are still undiscovered factors that contribute to 
acquisition performance. This is also one finding of the paper by King et al. (2004: 197), who 
conclude that “researchers simply may not be looking at the „right‟ set of variables as 
predictors of post-acquisition performance”. 
Some recent studies have been able to determine some of these variables. Compared to most 
extant research, these studies have taken a somewhat different perspective to acquisitions. 
Instead of attempting to find generic predictors of post-acquisition performance that are 
applicable to all acquisitions, they instead focus on determining if some sub-groups of the 
whole set of acquisitions exhibit above-average performance. For instance, it has been shown 
that acquisitions where the target is a private company (Capron and Shen, 2007) and 
acquisitions involving Internet companies (Uhlenbruck, Hitt and Semadeni, 2006) can create 
above-normal returns. 
This paper takes a similar approach by focusing on acquisitions of divested assets as a 
subgroup of all acquisitions. The extant acquisition research does not typically make a 
distinction between acquisitions of full companies compared to acquisitions of divested 
assets that other firms are selling. Yet, in most cases when a company divests some of its 
assets, they are actually sold to some other firm, and it is likely that divestitures have 
somewhat different characteristics as acquisition targets compared to stand-alone firms. The 
idea behind this study is to find out if these differences are also reflected in the post-
acquisition performance of the company buying the assets. 
The relatively few existing studies regarding acquisitions of divested assets are mostly from 
the field of corporate finance. Results from these studies show that these acquisitions range 
from value neutral (Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman, 2003) to positive (Jain, 1985; 
Rosenfeld, 1984) for the acquirer shareholders. However, there is also evidence of significant 
positive abnormal returns when the transaction price is revealed at time of the acquisition 
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announcement (Sicherman and Pettway, 1992) and when the buyer and the seller operate in 
related businesses (Sicherman and Pettway, 1987). Acquisitions of subsidiaries, a special case 
of divestments, have also been shown to yield significantly positive returns to bidders (Fuller, 
Netter and Stegemoller, 2002). 
Another recently emerged stream of literature departs from the traditional focus of single 
acquisitions, and takes a broader perspective of longer term acquisition programs consisting 
of multiple acquisitions. Studies in this stream indicate for example that firms which 
undertake acquisitions at a regular pace and incorporate them into a strategic acquisition 
program perform better in the long-term than companies that make acquisition decisions in 
an ad hoc fashion (Laamanen and Keil, 2008). Thus, instead of individual acquisitions, 
researchers should also put more emphasis on the larger perspective of multiple acquisitions. 
1.2 Research problem and objectives 
The overall research questions of this study can be stated as follows: 
In the software industry, do acquisitions of divested assets differ from acquisitions of stand-alone companies 
in terms of the acquiring firm’s post-acquisition performance? 
If yes, what is divestiture acquisitions’ effect on this performance (above or below average)? 
Are there any specific factors that moderate the post-acquisition performance? 
The research questions are further operationalized through hypotheses that are presented in 
chapter 3. 
The paper builds on two overall research tracks, namely corporate restructuring 
(divestments) and factors affecting the performance of mergers and acquisitions. As 
mentioned above, the extant M&A literature mostly does not make a difference between 
divestments and stand-alone firms as acquisition targets. Also the corporate restructuring 
studies have traditionally largely emphasized research from the divesting firm‟s, not the 
buyer‟s perspective. 
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The objective of this paper is first to construct a theoretical framework integrating the two 
aforementioned research tracks building on a variety of disciplines, such as strategic 
management, corporate finance, and organizational literature. Based on this framework a 
number of hypotheses are created, and these hypotheses are then tested to determine if 
divestment acquisitions exhibit differential performance, how the performance is affected, 
and if there are any factors that increase or decrease the performance. 
1.3 Research methods 
The theoretical framework is constructed by a qualitative literature review. The material 
consists mostly of studies published in academic journals, as well as some relevant textbooks. 
Credibility of the review is maintained by primarily selecting articles published in the most 
prestigious journals in the fields of strategic management and finance, using the ISI journal 
database to search for articles. Search for relevant literature was also started by conducting a 
“quick and dirty” bibliometric co-citation analysis using the SITKIS software package (see 
Schildt, 2002) in order to find the most relevant core articles in the various fields. However, 
as the co-citation analysis tends to neglect newer articles which haven‟t yet been able to 
accumulate many citations, the analysis was used as a starting point only. 
The empirical part of this study is done by quantitative analysis, first collecting a sample from 
various databases, and then building testable variables from this data according to the 
hypotheses. Hypotheses were then tested using multivariate regression analysis. Sample data 
and used methodology are explained in more detail in chapter 4. 
1.4 Definitions and scope 
Acquisition is defined as “the purchase by one company (the bidder) of a controlling interest 
in another company (the target)”, whereas a merger of equals “involves two companies… 
coming together to combine all of their assets” and creating an entirely new legal entity 
(Schoenberg, 2003: 588). In reality the distinction between these two is fairly ambiguous and 
pure mergers occur very rarely. Furthermore, both mergers and acquisitions share very 
similar underlying motives, objectives and criteria for success, and therefore both researchers 
and practitioners generally use the two terms interchangeably (Schoenberg, 2003; King et al., 
2004). This is also the stance adopted in this paper with one distinction: The above definition 
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of acquisition considers only stand-alone companies as targets, whereas this study takes into 
account also divested assets as acquisition targets, specifically making a distinction between 
these two cases. 
Also the terms sell-off, divestiture and divestment are used rather interchangeably, and are in 
this paper defined simply as the sale of some of a firm‟s assets to an outside buyer, mostly 
corresponding with the term sell-off. Strictly speaking, divestments include also other types 
of activities, such as spin-offs and equity carve-outs (Brauer, 2006). However, these 
transactions do not have a buyer that acquires the assets, and therefore are out of the scope 
of this study. 
This study makes a distinction between two types of acquisitions, depending on the 
acquisition target in question. The primary group of interest consists of acquisitions of 
divested assets (divestments), which are often also referred to as “divestiture acquisitions”. 
The second group includes acquisitions where the target is a stand-alone company. The term 
“regular acquisitions” is used to refer to this group1. 
The acquirer‟s post-acquisition performance mainly refers to financial performance of the 
acquirer after acquisition activity. The literature review does not make a strict restriction 
regarding the measure of performance, and therefore contains articles with both accounting 
and market based measures. On the other hand, the empirical part defines performance 
strictly as the change of the acquirer‟s market value both in the long and short term. The 
measures used in the empirical part are more thoroughly explained in chapter 4. 
The focal industry of this study is the software industry. The reason for focusing on a single 
industry is to eliminate possible differences between industries that may affect acquisition 
performance. For example, the study by Salo (2006) indicates that depending on the studied 
industry different acquisition performance factors are emphasized. Furthermore, acquisitions 
of divestments are especially common in the software industry, and thus the industry 
                                               
1 Use of the term “regular” does not imply that acquisitions of divestments are somehow irregular or 
uncommon. The term is used simply because the usual view of acquisitions considers the targets to be full 
companies (evident e.g. in the above definition as well as the majority of extant research). 
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provides a sufficiently large amount of data. The potential limitations caused by this 
restriction are discussed in the final conclusions (chapter 6). 
1.5 Structure of the report 
This paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 will present the literature review and the 
constructed theoretical framework. The hypotheses built on this framework are presented in 
chapter 3. Chapter 4 will describe the data and methodologies used. 
Chapter 5 will present the results from the various regression analyses as well as descriptive 
statistics and other complementary statistical tests. Finally, chapter 6 will present the 
conclusions of this study as well as discussion on the limitations and implications of the 
findings. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct an underlying theoretical framework based on 
existing research on the topics of divestitures and M&A performance factors. This 
framework is then used in the next chapter as a basis for creating testable hypotheses. The 
overall logical structure of how the theoretical framework is constructed is illustrated below 
(Figure 1: Structure of the literature review). The underlying premise is to identify possible 
factors affecting M&A performance, and consider the effect of these factors in the special 
case where the acquisition target is a divestment. 
M&A
Factors affecting M&A 
performance
Divestments
Antecedents of divestment
decisions
Characteristics of divested
units
Divestiture as a special case of acquisition target;
Effect on post-acquisition performance
 
Figure 1: St ucture of the liter ture review 
2.1 Acquisition motives and objectives 
Mergers and acquisitions are undertaken by companies for various reasons. Trautwein (1990) 
summarizes the seven most prominent theories that are generally used to explain acquisition 
decision-making. He concludes that the most credible theories are the valuation, empire-
building and process theories. Valuation theory states that firms carry out acquisitions when 
they have private information about the true value of the target company, and this true value 
is higher than the price of the firm (i.e. the firm is undervalued by the markets). The empire-
building theory is based on agency costs (Jensen, 1986) and proposes that managers make 
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acquisitions in order to increase their personal value (e.g. salary or importance for the firm). 
The fairly new process theory views acquisitions as a result of a complex process instead of a 
distinct decision made by the firm. (Trautwein, 1990) 
Other, moderately supported theories state that companies undertake acquisitions to e.g. gain 
synergies between the target and the acquirer (efficiency theory), or increase their market and 
bargaining power (monopoly theory). Furthermore, less supported theories view mergers as a 
result of changes in the macroeconomic environment (disturbance theory), or as takeovers 
where the often hostile buyer‟s motive is to gain from reselling the company for a profit, 
either in parts or as a whole (raider theory). (Trautwein, 1990) 
Another classification divides acquisition motives in three broad groups. First of all, motives 
can be strategic, meaning that acquisitions are undertaken to achieve some distinct strategic 
goal. Strategic acquisitions can aim to e.g. increase a firm‟s geographical or product market 
share, gain access to some valuable resources such as a distribution channel, or benefit from 
increased economies of scale. Second, acquisition can also be motivated by purely financial 
benefits, such as tax deductions or financial synergies. Thirdly, the motivation behind 
acquisitions can be managerial, which corresponds to Trautwein‟s (1990) empire-building 
theory. (Schoenberg, 2003) 
It is noteworthy that the motivation behind an acquisition decision has an effect on the 
subsequent performance of the acquirer. In general, acquisitions that are motivated by 
managerial self-interest are often detrimental to shareholder value (Schoenberg, 2003). For 
example, a strong CEO and a weak board of directors can often lead to the CEO making 
acquisitions that are overpaid and do not increase the firm‟s value, but instead strengthen the 
CEO‟s personal position or increase his compensation (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). 
2.2 Acquisition performance factors 
The majority of studies on acquisition performance conclude that the average performance 
of the acquirer is zero or slightly negative, whereas the effect on target‟s market value is 
usually positive (Datta, Pinches and Narayanan, 1992; King et al., 2004). Acquisition 
performance basically consists of two related aspects, which are the acquisition‟s potential for 
value creation, and the realization of this potential. Value creation potential is often described 
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by the rather ambiguous term of “synergy”: In order for the acquisition to increase the 
buyer‟s value, the value of the acquired firm combined with the buyer has to be higher than 
the total price paid for the target (target‟s market value plus any paid acquisition premium). 
Acquisition value creation is further illustrated below (Figure 2: Value creation in 
acquisitions). (Schoenberg, 2003) 
Total price
paid for target
Value of 
target after
acquisition
Stand-alone
value of target
Premium paid in 
excess of value
Stand-alone
value of target
Value that has to be created
to repay the premium
Abnormal value created to 
buyer Additional post-
acquisition value
created
 
Figure 2: Value creation in acquisitions 
However, merely having the ex ante potential of gaining synergistic value from an acquisition 
is not enough, since this potential value also needs to be realized. Thus, the value can be seen 
as actually created during and after the actual acquisition process (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991: 129), through tasks related to the integration of the merging firms and e.g. coping with 
employee resistance and cultural differences (Schoenberg, 2003). Many also argue that one of 
the main reasons why acquisitions fail to create value is because these integration costs are 
often much higher than anticipated (e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 129). 
2.2.1 Price, bid process and mode of payment 
An acquisition‟s price has a straightforward effect on its subsequent performance, as the 
price paid for a target has to be offset by the additional value created from the merger in 
order for the acquisition to create any abnormal returns to the acquirer (Schoenberg, 2003; 
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Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). In other words, the acquisition creates value simply when its 
net present value (NPV) is positive. This is also illustrated in the image above (Figure 2: 
Value creation in acquisitions): All other things held constant, a lower price of the acquisition 
results in higher abnormal returns to the buyer. 
One common argument regarding bid price is that often an acquirer overestimates the 
synergies it can obtain from an acquisition, and therefore ends up paying too high an 
acquisition premium, which in turn results in the observed bad performance of acquisitions 
(Sirower, 1997: 46). However, a high bid premium does not by itself result in negative 
acquisition performance. It is also possible that the target is already undervalued by the 
market due to e.g. an information asymmetry discount of assets that are difficult to value 
(such as R&D investments), and in these cases a higher bid premium could also be justified 
(Laamanen, 2007). Furthermore, the concept of bid premium is by definition only applicable 
to public targets. Therefore, when regarding the effects of bid price, total price paid for the 
acquisition should be considered. 
Factors affecting the bid price are the amount of bidders and the overall “mood” (friendly vs. 
hostile) of the bidding process. Competitive bidding between multiple potential buyers may 
result in the so-called winner‟s curse, a situation where competing bids drive the total price 
up until the acquisition‟s NPV is close to zero (Barney, 1988). Thus, friendly and less 
competitive acquisitions can result in lower acquisition price and consequently higher returns 
(Datta et al., 1992). This effect is somewhat moderated by information asymmetries between 
the target and acquirer: If the two firms operate in related businesses, the target is better 
aware of its true value to the buyer and can therefore demand a higher price (Flanagan and 
O‟Shaughnessy, 2003). 
Another factor that has been shown to have a positive impact on acquisition price is CEO 
hubris (exaggerated self-confidence) (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). Overconfident 
directors often overestimate the value they can create from an acquisition, and end up paying 
too much for the target. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that a relatively high portion of 
poor acquisitions have been undertaken by so-called “glamour” firms, which are already 
overvalued by the market and are characterized by a high level managerial over-confidence. 
The short-term returns from these acquisitions are often positive, which increases CEO 
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hubris even further (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). However, as more information on the actual 
value of the acquisition becomes available and the buyer‟s market value is consequently 
corrected, the long-term returns are significantly negative. This is most evident during the 
dot-com boom of 1999-2000: In the bullish market nearly all acquisitions were valued highly 
positive by the market, but as the true value of the acquisitions became evident the market 
reacted by a huge drop in values (Moeller et al., 2005). 
Some studies also show that the method of payment used in an acquisition has an effect on 
acquisition performance. The crux of the argument is that rational firms finance acquisitions 
using the most profitable means available; In particular, an acquiring manager tends to 
finance acquisitions primarily by stock if he feels his firm‟s shares are overvalued, and by 
cash if he thinks the shares are undervalued (Travlos, 1987). Thus, the mode of payment 
should be a strong indicator of the acquirer‟s confidence regarding returns from the 
acquisition (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). On average, the long-term returns to acquirer have 
shown to be higher for cash transactions (Datta et al., 1992). For example, Loughran and 
Vijh (1997) studied the five-year period following an acquisition and found that the average 
returns for stock financed mergers created negative abnormal returns of -25.0%, whereas 
acquisitions paid by cash created positive returns of 61.7% to acquirer shareholders. In a 
more recent meta-analysis King and colleagues (2004) found no significant effect between 
different methods of payment, albeit with a much shorter observation window (1 to 16 days 
after the announcement). 
2.2.2 Acquisition relatedness and resource transfer 
One of the most actively studied, and also somewhat controversial, determinant of post-
acquisition performance is the relatedness between the buyer and the target (King et al., 
2004), where relatedness refers to the similarity of businesses between the two firms (Rumelt, 
1982). In general, it has been shown that unrelated diversification destroys value (Rumelt, 
1982; Loughran and Vijh, 1997). Since unrelated acquisitions by definition increase a firm‟s 
level of diversification more than related acquisitions, target relatedness can be argued to 
have a significant effect on acquirer‟s performance. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
related acquisitions should create more value because the acquirer has better knowledge of 
the target business and can therefore leverage its resources and gain synergies more 
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efficiently (Capron, Dussauge and Mitchell, 1998). However, many studies argue and 
demonstrate that it is not relatedness in itself that creates abnormal returns to the buyer 
(Barney, 1988; King et al., 2004). Singh and Montgomery (1987) show that the additional 
economic value from related acquisitions shows as a positive effect only in returns to the 
target shareholders, not the bidder. Similarly, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992: 107) “do not find 
strong evidence that diversifying acquisitions are less successful than related ones”. Bruton, 
Oviatt and White (1994) find that relatedness in itself seems to have a significant positive 
effect only when the target firm is financially distressed, reasoning that in-depth knowledge 
of the poorly performing target‟s business is essential to be able to turn it around. 
One approach to the relatedness issue is found by applying the resource-based view of the 
firm (RBV). RBV considers firms as bundles of unique, valuable resources, and argues that 
companies create value by applying these resources in ways that competitors cannot readily 
imitate (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Resources are defined as “those (tangible and 
intangible) assets which are tied semipermanently to the firm”, for example “brand names, 
in-house knowledge of technology, employment of skilled personnel, trade contacts, 
machinery, efficient procedures, capital, etc.” (Wernerfelt, 1984: 172). 
Similarly, acquisitions create abnormal value when they result in resource combinations that 
would not be available to other potential acquirers, but instead create some uniquely valuable, 
inimitable or unexpected cash flows (Barney, 1988). Thus, it is not relatedness or similarity by 
themselves that can create synergistic value, but the complementarities between the buyers‟s 
and target‟s resource bases (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 1991; 2001). Generally, 
these synergies can be obtained by two means: By leveraging and combining valuable 
resources (revenue-based synergies), or rationalizing and improving asset efficiency and 
gaining economies of scale (cost-based synergies) (Capron, 1999). 
Chatterjee (1992) studied tender offers of public companies, and found that most of these 
transactions were motivated by restructuring of the target, rather than synergistic value 
creation and that most of the potential value resided within the target firm. The returns to 
bidding firms in his study were also significantly negative, showing that mere restructuring of 
the target is not a value-creating acquisition strategy. If the value potential is only attributable 
to the target, there is no reason why they, or any other acquirer, couldn‟t appropriate this 
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value individually. Therefore, target shareholders also will not sell the firm for less than this 
value, driving the price up until the restructuring no longer creates value for the bidder. 
Recent studies employing the resource-based view have been able to find empirical evidence 
of factors contributing to acquisition success. Capron and Pistre (2002) study the transfer of 
resources between the target and acquirer after an acquisition. They find that when the 
acquirer transfers its resources to the target organization, it is often able to create above-
normal returns, but when only target resources are transferred to the buyer, the acquirer‟s 
abnormal returns are zero. This supports the above argument of Barney (1988), since 
synergies obtained only from leveraging the target‟s resource base are less likely to be unique 
to this specific acquirer. 
Capron and Pistre (2002) additionally show that the most valuable resource combinations 
occur when the acquirer transfers its innovation and managerial capabilities to the target, 
while using the target‟s own marketing resources, whereas transfer of marketing resources 
from acquirer to target actually results in negative returns. They argue that this is because 
marketing resources are usually very context-dependent. For example, in cross-border 
acquisitions the target most likely has superior knowledge of their home market compared to 
the acquirer. 
Uhlenbruck and colleagues (2006) show that acquisitions of Internet companies have 
historically created positive abnormal returns to the acquirer, also after the dot-com boom. 
They argue that this is due to combinations of highly complementary resources from both 
the target and acquirer; e.g. the “offline” buyer gets access to technology and improvement 
of operational efficiency, while the “online” target benefits from the buyer‟s legitimacy, 
physical assets and relational capital such as contacts to suppliers. In technological 
acquisitions, the target‟s knowledge base has been shown to increase the acquirer‟s 
innovation performance (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Although the latter study does not strictly 
measure the acquirer‟s market performance, it nevertheless shows that asset efficiency can be 
improved through acquisitions of complementary resources. 
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2.2.3 Information asymmetries and valuation 
Information asymmetries can also have an effect on the price of an acquisition. Often 
different sides of a transaction have differing knowledge regarding the value of the assets in 
question. Usually the buyer has less information of the target than the seller, and therefore it 
bears the risk of a possibility that the target has some hidden (negative) aspects that the buyer 
is not aware of ex ante (Akerlof, 1970). 
In acquisitions information asymmetries may result in higher search costs for the acquirer in 
form of e.g. due diligence, and this together with the risk of adverse selection can result in a 
discount in the acquisition‟s price (Capron and Shen, 2007). One example of this is the 
“private firm discount” (Kooli, Kortas and L‟Her, 2003): Information regarding publicly 
traded firms is relatively transparent, since the stock market and its requirements of 
information disclosure work as an “information processing and asset valuation mechanism”, 
which is available to all (Capron and Shen, 2007: 891). However, similar information on 
private firms is much less readily available, and therefore when acquiring a private firm much 
more effort has to be put into locating potential targets and assessing the value of these 
firms. This is argued to be the main cause of the observed private firm discount (Ragozzino 
and Reuer, 2007). 
From the perspective of this study, the above discussion has one main implication. Similarly 
to private firms, there often exists little publicly available information about a single business 
unit of a larger firm, and even less about some individual assets within a firm. This 
uncertainty in assessing the value of single assets or business segments has been argued as a 
reason for the “diversification discount” (King et al., 2004), i.e. the observed phenomenon 
that diversified firms‟ market value is on average less than would be the sum of its parts 
individually (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Thus, it can be argued that when these assets are sold 
to some other firm (i.e. divested), this information asymmetry can lead to a price discount 
compared to a similar stand-alone target. 
Relatedness has a moderating effect on the information asymmetries, but the effect is often 
rather context dependent. When considering private targets, a related buyer should be on 
average better aware of potential targets, and also better able to determine the actual value of 
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these targets due to lower information asymmetries (Capron and Shen, 2007). In contrast, 
Flanagan and O‟Shaughnessy (2003) show that in public mergers a related acquirer often 
tends to pay a higher price. This is because in these cases the target managers and 
shareholders can better determine their firm‟s actual value to the acquirer, and can 
consequently demand a price closer to this value. 
When the acquisition target is a divestment, there is one key distinction; since the target and 
its original parent do not necessarily operate in related businesses, there is a possibility of 
information asymmetries also between these two and the acquirer. In particular, building on 
the argument of Flanagan and O‟Shaughnessy (2003) the unrelated seller (i.e. divesting 
parent) might not be able to effectively determine the divested assets‟ synergistic value to the 
related acquirer, and are therefore less likely to demand a price close to the acquirer‟s walk-
away price. On the other hand, this benefit might also be nonexistent for two reasons. 
Firstly, the managers of the business unit itself, or the assets in question, can determine its 
true value to the acquirer and communicate it to the parent company. Secondly, the seller 
could also determine the value through other means, e.g. an evaluation by experts such as 
investment bankers. 
2.2.4 Post-acquisition integration 
Post-acquisition integration is the phase when all the potential additional value between the 
buyer and target is actually realized, and as such an extremely critical part of the whole 
acquisition process (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 129). This paper does not take all the 
issues of post-acquisition integration into account, since most of them affect acquisition 
performance more on a case-by-case basis (for example, change management and leadership 
are very situation dependent). For a more extensive coverage of the topic, see for example 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), or Teerikangas (2006). 
One issue relevant in this paper‟s scope concerns whether or not the target‟s top managers 
stay in the company after an acquisition. Cannella and Hambrick (1993: 137) show that 
retaining the top executives of the acquired company results in higher post-acquisition 
performance, as these executives “are an intrinsic component of the acquired firm‟s resource 
base”. Bergh (2001) builds on this finding, and concludes that keeping those top managers 
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who have been in the acquired organization for the longest period of time has the biggest 
positive effect on post-acquisition performance. This is consistent with the resource-based 
view, as the accumulated experience and knowledge of those directors can be seen as a 
valuable resource that can be leveraged in the acquisition process. Key target firm leaders 
may also be able to create additional value for the acquirer which is entirely new and 
unexpected prior to the acquisition (Graebner, 2004). 
On the whole, high turnover of the target firm‟s managers has a negative effect on post-
acquisition performance. Walsh (1989) found that the “mood” of the acquisition negotiation 
significantly affects the management turnover later, with hostile acquisitions resulting in 
much higher turnover rate than friendly acquisitions. Another crucial factor is the relative 
standing of the target‟s top executives prior to and after the acquisition (Hambrick and 
Cannella, 1993; Lubatkin, Schweiger and Weber, 1999). Specifically, “acquired executives 
may feel, or be made to feel, a loss of status at their job”, and the magnitude of this negative 
feeling increases the rate of managerial turnover (Lubatkin et al., 1999: 56). 
Regarding this, one difference between acquisitions of divestments and full companies could 
be that in the latter case the relative standing of the target‟s directors would probably 
decrease more than when the target is a divestiture. In most acquisitions the target becomes a 
division of the buyer, so after the acquisition the top managers of a previously independent 
firm become “only” top managers of a business division (e.g. CEO of the target firm 
becomes only the CEO of one business division). In contrast, when the target is a division to 
begin with, the relative standing should remain on average the same. Naturally this argument 
is only applicable to divestment acquisitions where the target includes managerial or human 
resources, such as subsidiaries. Studies regarding relative standing in acquisitions of 
divestitures do not exist and therefore the argument should be treated as a hypothesis only. 
Speed of integration can also affect the acquisition‟s success, as speed reduces uncertainty of 
both firms‟ employees and customers. When the bidder and target have a strong strategic fit 
and similar management styles, and little overlap between product or target markets, the 
speed of post-acquisition integration has a positive effect on the returns to acquirer 
(Homburg and Bucerius, 2006). However, speed of integration may also have a detrimental 
effect on performance when it depends on indentifying the truly valuable resource 
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combinations, as suggested by e.g. Barney (1988) and Capron and Pistre (2002), since this 
usually requires time and effort. Therefore this argument should also be treated with caution. 
2.2.5 Acquisition experience and multiple acquisitions 
Already Kusewitt (1985) showed that acquisition programs consisting of multiple individual 
acquisitions can have a positive effect on the acquirer‟s performance. However, only recently 
has research been shifting from looking at single acquisitions as individual and independent 
observations towards studying multiple acquisitions and how they relate to a longer-term 
acquisition program. 
Acquisition experience research, rooted in the organizational learning literature, studies a 
firm‟s accumulated experience from prior acquisitions as a factor affecting post-acquisition 
performance. As companies make more acquisitions, they gain experience and can use this 
experience to benefit later acquisitions. Haleblian and Finkelstein‟s (1999) study shows that 
the effect of previous acquisitions is not linear, but takes the shape of a U. They posit that 
after the first few acquisitions, firms inappropriately generalize factors that are actually 
dissimilar in later acquisitions. 
Similarity of succeeding acquisitions has a positive effect on acquisition performance, since 
similarity decreases the possibility of inappropriate generalization (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 
2002). A firm can also increase its acquisition learning from partners with a diverse pool of 
accumulated acquisition experiences (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002). Bruton and 
colleagues (1994) studied acquisitions of distressed firms, and showed that for firms that had 
prior experience of acquiring distressed targets the post-acquisition performance was higher. 
Hayward‟s (2002) study shows that merely acquiring more does not necessarily increase 
acquisition experience. Instead, in order to accumulate experience that increases the 
performance of later acquisitions, the prior acquisitions need to be moderately but not too 
similar to each other, associated with small losses, and undertaken at a steady pace. If the 
acquisitions are too similar to each other, it limits the potential for learning. Firms also tend 
to learn more when they incur small losses in order to minimize the risk of repeating the 
mistake. A steady pace of acquisitions ensures that the acquirer is able to digest and process 
all the information in time for the next acquisition. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest the 
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term “absorptive capacity” as the capacity of a firm to assimilate new knowledge over time, 
and show that this capacity increases as accumulated knowledge increases. The steady pace of 
multiple acquisitions can also build significant acquisition momentum in the acquirer, 
resulting in a self-strengthening feedback loop (Amburgey and Miner, 1992). 
Acquisition pace affects a firm‟s performance also through other means than accumulation 
of knowledge, since accumulation of new assets are subject to time-compression 
diseconomies (Dietrickx and Cool, 1989). In other words, firms are often not able to “digest” 
a large amount of new assets in a relatively short time frame. 
Recent findings suggest that perhaps more important than the accumulation of acquisition 
experience is that the acquisitions are linked to an overall corporate strategy, and are 
undertaken in a systematic manner. Vermeulen and Barkema (2002) demonstrate that speed 
and irregularity of a firm‟s internationalization is negatively related to performance. 
Laamanen and Keil (2008) extend this finding to acquisitions, showing that firms that make 
acquisitions at a steady pace exhibit above-normal performance. A steady acquisition rhythm 
indicates that the individual acquisitions are linked in a longer-term strategic acquisition 
program. In contrast, an irregular pace is a sign that the acquisitions are made in an “ad hoc” 
opportunistic manner whenever a seemingly good acquisition possibility presents itself. 
2.3 Corporate diversification 
Corporate diversification is quite strongly linked to both acquisitions and divestments, and 
the purpose of this part is to briefly discuss diversification, its motives and outcomes. 
Diversification can essentially be defined as a firm‟s entry into new lines of business 
(Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989), although the actual definition varies to some extent 
between studies. A “new line of business” can refer to, for example, a new product, a new 
industry, or a new geographical market, depending on the definition used. 
A firm‟s degree of diversification is also considered to vary between related and unrelated. 
Relatedness basically considers the degree of commonality between the various business lines 
of the company, ranging from single dominant business firms to conglomerates with 
multiple, very weakly related business lines (Palepu, 1985; Rumelt, 1982). In reality most 
companies fall somewhere between these two extremes. 
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2.3.1 Motives of diversification 
There are multiple reasons why a firm might pursue diversification. Penrose‟s (1959) seminal 
work argues that firms grow when they have excess resources which are directed to new 
operations. Depending on the flexibility of these resources, they may be used to diversify 
into either related or unrelated businesses. For example, some tangible resources such as 
manufacturing plants are less flexible and usually can only be used to produce similar goods, 
whereas financial resources can be used to diversify to practically any new business 
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). In any case, if a firm observes an opportunity to leverage its 
existing resources in a new business or market, it may choose to diversify. 
Another motive for diversification, widely endorsed in the 1970s, is striving to create a 
balanced portfolio of businesses. A balanced portfolio is defined as a combination of various 
businesses in a corporation, of which some create cash especially in the short term, and some 
offer high future growth prospects. The parent firm then controls what businesses are 
included in the portfolio and makes capital allocation decisions to ensure profitability and 
growth (Goold and Luchs, 2003). 
A balanced portfolio is also considered a means to reduce corporate risk through 
diversification. Operating in only one business increases the firm‟s cash flow risk if this 
business declines, and diversifying to unrelated businesses decreases this risk. However, 
unrelated diversification as risk reduction mechanism has been widely criticized, since it 
doesn‟t actually reduce the firm‟s total risk. Risk reduction through diversification also rarely 
benefit shareholders, since they could also accomplish often more efficiently it by merely 
investing in different individual companies (Lubatkin and O‟Neill, 1987). 
A third reason for diversification is managerial self-interest (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). Firm 
managers might increase diversification in order to maximize their personal utility, e.g. 
through a reduction in the manager‟s employment risk or increase in compensation (Jensen, 
1986). Also a firm‟s macroeconomic environment may affect diversification decisions. For 
example, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) show that in the 1960s US antitrust laws created strong 
incentives for high levels of diversification. 
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2.3.2 Effects of diversification 
In the 1960s and 1970s high levels of diversification were generally supported, with portfolio 
planning used extensively. During the recent decades, however, the view on diversification 
has been shifting towards a somewhat more critical direction. Rumelt (1982) studied large US 
corporations and showed that the most profitable firms exhibited related diversification 
instead of unrelated. Using a different methodology, Palepu (1985: 239) arrived at similar 
results, stating that “firms with predominantly related diversification show significantly better 
profit growth than firms with predominantly unrelated diversification.” 
A high level of unrelated diversification also has a negative effect on the firm‟s market value 
(Lang and Stulz, 1994). Berger and Ofek‟s (1995) study shows that the market value of a 
diversified company is on average 13-15 percent lower than the aggregate value of all its 
segments individually. Similarly, Comment and Jarrell (1995) show that the market values of 
companies with greater corporate focus (i.e. lower levels of diversification) are higher than 
the values of diversified corporations. This phenomenon is generally known as the 
“diversification discount”. 
In some cases, this difference in value also enables arbitrage through takeovers: Since the 
value of the diversified corporation is less than the sum of its parts, it can be possible for an 
outsider to buy the company, and then sell it in parts for more than the acquisition price. The 
hostile takeover wave in US in the 1980s is a prominent example of this “corporate raider” 
activity (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). 
Diversification also has other effects on a firm‟s operations. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) 
studied diversification level‟s effect on corporate R&D spending, and found that unrelated 
diversification decreases the amount of R&D spending. They hypothesize that, as unrelated 
diversification strongly encourages financial control of the business units, managers of these 
units tend to be more risk averse and focus on short-term financial benefits rather than 
invest cash in R&D. Thus, high unrelated diversification can also have a detrimental effect 
on the company‟s long-term performance. 
However, most studies show that the relationship between diversification and performance is 
in reality inverted U shaped (Palich, Cardinal and Miller, 2000). In other words, 
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diversification is beneficial up to a point, and after that its profitability starts to decline. Also 
Markides (1995) argues that firms have an optimal level of diversification, and diversification 
over this point leads to value destruction. Thus, diversification does create value but only up 
to a point. Besides product or business-level diversification, the same relationship between 
diversification and performance is seen in international diversification (Hitt, Hoskisson and 
Kim, 1997).  
The current view on the value creation of diversification is quite well summed by Goold and 
Luchs (2003: 530): “Businesses should not be retained in the portfolio or added to the 
portfolio unless the parent company can create more value from the businesses than they 
could create on their own or with any other parent”. In other words, there need to be distinct 
synergies between the business units in order for diversification to be worthwhile. Otherwise 
there is no reason why the business division wouldn‟t be better off on its own. 
The resource-based view, as described earlier, suggests that these synergies between a firm‟s 
various businesses should leverage the firm‟s valuable key resources (Barney, 1991). Another, 
related term often used in practitioner context is “core competencies”, as introduced by 
Hamel and Prahalad (1989). Essentially, firms should diversify to businesses where they can 
make use of their unique resources and competencies, or build new ones based on their 
existing competencies. Sharing resources and assets between the diverse businesses thus 
creates value e.g. through economies of scale and scope (Markides and Williamson, 1994). 
2.4 Corporate restructuring and divestments 
The term corporate restructuring consists of a plethora of activities, such as changing an 
organization‟s internal structure, divesting assets through sell-offs or spin-offs, or reducing 
the amount of employees through lay-offs (Brauer, 2006). The general purpose of corporate 
restructuring is to increase the firm‟s competitiveness through strategic realignment by either 
cutting costs, or exiting or entering various businesses (Johnson, 1996). In this paper the 
focus is on divestments, and their subsequent acquisitions by another firms. Therefore, the 
other aspects of restructuring are left for little discussion. 
The purpose of this chapter is to first review the relevant factors that affect divestment 
decision-making on a corporate level, and then to study how these relate to the structure and 
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characteristics of the divested unit or assets, and the overall divestment situation. The 
objective is to find factors that make the divestment situation and the assets that are divested 
different from stand-alone companies in terms of their acquisition. 
Johnson (1996) categorizes the motives and factors affecting divestment decisions in five 
categories: Factors related to external environment, corporate governance, diversification 
strategy, firm performance, and financial restructuring. In reality these factors or categories 
are not independent from each other, but are actually causally linked (Hoskisson, Johnson 
and Moesel, 1994). For example, weak corporate governance can lead to inefficient over-
diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990), which further results in poor firm performance 
(Hoskisson and Turk, 1990). However, due to clarity of presentation the factors are in 
general discussed separately below. 
2.4.1 Governance factors affecting divestment decisions 
In this paper corporate governance mainly refers to the various means that owners 
(shareholders) of a corporation use to control the firm‟s managers, e.g. through the board of 
directors. One main concern of agency theory is differences between motives and interests of 
the principal (in this case the firm‟s owners) and the agent they have entrusted with a 
responsibility of a certain task (the CEO who runs the company) (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
purpose of governance is essentially to mitigate the problems caused by this principal-agent 
problem. 
Jensen‟s (1986) seminal paper studies the problems of agency costs, meaning the costs 
incurred to shareholders because of managerial self-interest. As payouts of free cash flow to 
shareholders decrease the amount of resources in the manager‟s disposal (and thus his 
relative power), when corporate governance is weak, managers have an incentive to invest in 
low return projects such as over-diversification, rather than return the cash to shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986). Markides (1992) points out that one of the reasons why companies might 
continuously pursue inefficient over-diversification is due to weak governance mechanisms, 
which in turn increases the associated agency costs. 
In this sense, divestments can often be a controlling action to corporate over-diversification 
due to previously inefficient governance mechanisms (Johnson, 1996). Ownership 
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concentration is one measure of governance strength, and high concentration (i.e. strong 
governance) has been shown to significantly decrease a firm‟s level of product diversification 
(Hoskisson et al., 1994). Similarly, Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) found that a major 
determinant of corporate restructuring and reductions in diversification in the 1980s was the 
existence of blockholders (i.e. concentrated ownership). These findings suggest that, in 
general, managers can be reluctant to restructure, and that efficient governance through large 
blockholders can act as a disciplinary force. 
Governance also plays a role in moderating which kinds of businesses a corporation will 
most likely divest. Building on the resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984), studies have 
shown that there are two ways that diversified companies can leverage their resources: By 
achieving strategic benefits through cooperative control mechanisms, or financial gains 
through competitive control (Hill, Hitt and Hoskisson, 1992). Strategic benefits arise from 
sharing resources between the business units, and therefore require cooperation between the 
units. On the other hand, financial benefits can be gained through more efficient capital 
allocation within the firm than could be possible through acquiring funds from the external 
capital market independently (Bergh, 1995). Due to their differences these also require 
different diversification strategies: Competitive control where business units compete against 
each other for capital allocations is best suited to unrelated diversification, and cooperative 
control for related (Hill et al., 1992). 
Related diversification has been shown to increase shareholder wealth more than unrelated, 
and therefore shareholders would naturally prefer this. In contrast, managers have an 
incentive to pursue unrelated diversification since it increases the company‟s revenue streams 
and the manager‟s personal power. Thus, the target for divestment depends on the divesting 
firm‟s governance: Efficient governance leads to divestments of unrelated and smaller 
business units, whereas weak governance leads to larger, more related sell-offs. (Bergh, 1995) 
2.4.2 Strategic factors affecting divestment decisions 
As argued above, a firm‟s chosen diversification strategy is one important factor influencing 
divestment decision making. Besides the amount of diversification, a company can have 
varying degrees (related-unrelated) of diversification, and these in turn are linked to the firm‟s 
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control mechanisms (cooperative versus competitive). When a firm changes its 
diversification strategy for some reason, an effective way to change the level of 
diversification is to divest some parts. Often an inefficient level of diversification leads to 
decreased performance (e.g. Palepu, 1985). This in turn necessitates a new diversification 
strategy and a subsequent need for corporate refocusing through divestments (Johnson, 
1996). 
Markides (1992) has argued that every firm has an optimal degree of diversification, which is 
the point where the marginal costs and marginal benefits of diversification are equal. Thus, 
rational firms should diversify up to this limit, and those over-diversified firms above this 
limit should take actions to refocus. However, there exists evidence of systematic over-
diversification (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1991), which indicates that firms do not always 
behave in fully rational ways (Markides, 1992). This over-diversification could result from 
inadequate corporate governance and managerial self-interest as described above (Jensen, 
1986), or simply poor formulation of the firm‟s diversification strategy (Hoskisson et al., 
1994).  
Besides irrational behavior, systematic over-diversification can also be caused by a decrease 
in the overall level of optimal diversification for companies (Markides, 1992). These are 
usually attributable to changes in the macroeconomic and regulative environment (Johnson, 
1996), and are discussed in the part regarding environmental factors below. 
Regardless of the reason behind a firm‟s suboptimal level of diversification, when 
considering strategic refocusing, divestments are a means to change the degree of 
diversification towards better efficiency (Markides, 1992). Thus, refocusing includes issues 
such as improving strategic fit and relatedness between business units and emphasizing core 
operations (Johnson, 1996). This is supported by Duhaime and Grant (1984) who show that 
divested units are often quite loosely coupled with other business units in the company, as 
measured by shared technologies, customers and facilities. Other reasons are also perceived 
lack of strength of the business unit, and low managerial attachment to the unit.  
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2.4.3 Performance-related factors affecting divestment decisions 
One strong predictor of a business unit‟s divestment is related to performance of both the 
unit itself as well as the parent company relative to the average industry performance 
(Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991). Duhaime and Grant (1984) conducted a field study of 40 
large diversified firms and found that both the parent firm‟s weak financial position relative 
to the industry, as well as poor performance of the divested business unit were major reasons 
for decisions to divest. However, these two factors should be considered separately, since 
poor parent performance doesn‟t necessarily imply poor performance of the business unit, 
and vice versa. 
If the parent company‟s performance is poor relative to the industry, it is reflected among 
other things in its market value and competitiveness. If the poor performance can be 
attributed to an inefficient level of diversification, the firm may rationalize its operations 
through restructuring to improve its efficiency, as described above (Johnson, 1996). 
However, it is also possible that a firm has to engage in restructuring even though its poor 
performance is not because of its level of diversification but some entirely other factor, such 
as poor product development or marketing, or simply wrong strategy. If a firm has a high 
amount of debt and a lack of cash, it is very unlikely to be able to meet the requirements of 
its creditors in longer term and thus faces a risk of bankruptcy (Brown, James and 
Mooradian, 1994). In this case, the firm may simply have to sell some of its assets in order to 
raise needed liquidity and avoid bankruptcy (Pulvino, 1998). 
The reason for divestment should also in this case affect the assets that are divested. In the 
former case, as argued above, the divested unit depends on the firm‟s chosen diversification 
strategy and the related control mechanism (Bergh, 1995). If the parent is leveraging financial 
and competitive control mechanisms, it would most likely try to improve its efficiency by 
divesting the worst-performing business unit and therefore freeing financial resources to be 
invested in the more profitable units. However, if the firm is leveraging its resources through 
strategic and cooperative control, the divested unit should be the one most unrelated to the 
other units, regardless of its individual performance. In this case the divested unit can even 
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be individually the most valuable one, but one that doesn‟t fit into the overall strategic focus 
of the firm. (Hill et al., 1992) 
If the firm is financially distressed and divests to avoid bankruptcy, it would most likely 
choose the divested assets by weighing their contribution to the firm‟s overall cash flow 
against the price obtained by selling them to an outsider (Pulvino, 1998). Thus, the 
divestment is most likely unrelated to the divesting firm‟s core business, and also more 
valuable to the buyer than the divesting firm. 
Fluck and Lynch (1999) also present a framework for divestments where the decision to 
divest is not attributed to the divested unit‟s poor performance. In their argument, 
companies with excess cash first acquire other marginally profitable firms that cannot obtain 
financing independently from external capital markets, e.g. a start-up that can‟t obtain 
venture capital funding; this indicates that there is a financial synergy between the two. When 
the acquired firm is able to obtain funding elsewhere, the financial synergy ends and the firm 
is divested, with possible returns to the divesting firm (in this sense the model is similar to 
private equity investing). Their framework thus suggests that there should exist some 
synergies between the target and the new acquirer, which are better than the existing financial 
synergies between the parent and the unit. 
2.4.4 Environmental factors affecting divestment decisions 
When considering factors affecting divestment decisions, environmental factors are those 
exogenous to the focal firm. They are most often related to regulatory changes (e.g. tax 
rationale or antitrust policy changes), or competitive factors (e.g. macro-level industry 
changes, threat of takeover, etc.) (Johnson, 1996). 
Environmental factors can also affect divestment decisions directly or indirectly. A regulatory 
change might directly force a firm to exit some business and thus divest some of its assets. 
However, in most cases the effect is indirect. One of the main reasons for systematic 
corporate over-diversification, and subsequent refocusing, has historically been due to 
changes in the economic or regulatory environment, which in turn decrease the optimal 
point of diversification for the companies. This has been attributed to “changes in product 
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and capital markets have reduced the inherent benefits of diversification while increasing its 
costs” (Markides, 1992: 41). 
Besides changes in markets, also one possible reason for over-diversification has historically 
been due to regulatory changes such as antitrust policies (i.e. competition law). High levels of 
diversification could have been feasible at a certain point due to the regulatory environment 
at that time. However, as regulations change, high diversification can become less efficient 
leading to refocusing of diversified firms. Shleifer and Vishny (1991) show how this is 
especially notable in the US “conglomeratization” wave of the 1960s, and the subsequent 
1980s wave of (often hostile) corporate raiders taking these conglomerates apart after this 
became feasible due to regulatory changes. 
An overall decline in a company‟s operating industry may also often trigger a need for 
pursuing a more efficient level of corporate focus (Anand and Singh, 1997). Furthermore, 
Bergh and Lawless (1998) show that increased environmental uncertainty increases the 
divestment intensity in highly diversified firms, as these firms are most affected by the 
increased information processing and management costs due to uncertainty. 
2.4.5 Factors related to financial restructuring 
Financial restructuring involves actions that significantly change the corporate capital 
structure (e.g. amounts of debt and equity). Divestitures due to financial restructuring occurs 
mostly in association with leveraged buyouts (LBOs), and other similar arrangements 
(Johnson, 1996) – either during or right after the LBO transaction. The idea of a leveraged 
buyout is that a company or some parts of it are acquired using a large amount of debt as 
payment. The acquired firm also has the liability of paying back the loan. The high amount of 
leverage also increases the financial distress costs, i.e. costs of managing debt through 
principal and interest payments. These increased costs need to be covered by the firm‟s cash 
flow, or else it faces the risk of bankruptcy (Opler and Titman, 1993). 
The divestments due to financial restructuring are thus related to the “control function” of 
debt creation, as illustrated by Jensen (1986): As a poor performing firm takes a substantial 
amount of new debt, it often has to simultaneously improve its efficiency or face bankruptcy, 
and corporate restructuring is one way of accomplishing this. Thus, the cash generated from 
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the sell-off can be directly used to pay back a part of the debt, or alternatively invested in 
some projects in the firm and use returns from these projects to pay the debt. 
The factors related to financial restructuring do not directly affect the divestment decision or 
characteristics of the divested unit, but through other factors (e.g. performance related 
factors). These direct factors are covered above, and therefore financial restructuring is not 
discussed in more detail in this paper. 
2.4.6 Effects on the divesting firm 
Johnson (1996) categorizes the outcomes of a divestment in three different groups, namely 
the divestment‟s effect on firm strategy, on firm performance, and related employee effects. 
Besides these, Hoskisson and Turk (1990) point out that restructuring should also improve 
the efficiency of the corporation‟s governance mechanisms since restructuring decreases 
complexity of the company. 
Divestitures necessarily involve a reduction in the firm‟s business scope, and therefore 
change its degree of diversification (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990). Depending on what is 
divested, the company moves towards a more related or more unrelated diversification 
strategy (Johnson, 1996). This in turn has an effect on the firm‟s control mechanisms 
(strategic versus financial) and depends on the balance of power between managers and 
shareholders (Bergh, 1995). 
The performance effects of divestitures exhibit some variation depending on the situation, 
but on average the long-term effects to the refocusing company are positive (Johnson, 1996). 
Montgomery, Thomas and Kamath (1984) studied a sample of 78 divestiture announcements 
made in the Wall Street Journal during the years 1976-1979, and found that divestitures 
linked to overall corporate strategy were valued positively by the stock market, whereas more 
ad hoc type divestments resulted in a decrease in stock prices. There is also a similar 
distinction between the relatedness of the divested business and the post-divestment 
profitability of the divesting company. In general, selling related business units has a negative 
effect on post-sell-off performance (Bergh, 1995), which implies that this decreases the 
strategic competitiveness of the company. 
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Also John and Ofek (1995) show that focus-increasing divestitures result in increased value 
for the divestor, since the seller is able to more efficiently manage its remaining assets after 
the divestment. Markides (1992), shows that on average all refocusing by over-diversified 
companies create positive abnormal shareholder value. Furthermore, for those companies 
that were both over-diversified and also poorly performing, refocusing created clearly the 
highest returns. 
Some researchers have even proposed that a divestiture of previously acquired company is 
simply a correction to a previously made mistake of acquiring the firm (Allen, Lummer, 
McConnell and Reed, 1995). Thus, if an acquisition resulted in over-diversification, divesting 
the same acquisition later can be seen as a correction towards a more efficient level of 
diversification. 
2.4.7 Characteristics of divestitures and the divested unit 
When considering the above antecedents of divestiture decisions in light of the divested unit 
or asset itself, a few key elements can be derived. Firstly, many of the divesting firms have 
historically been conglomerates, or corporations operating multiple businesses that are 
usually not strongly related (Johnson, 1996; Hoskisson et al., 1994). These are also the firms 
that are most positively affected by divestment announcements (Markides, 1992; 1995), 
especially when they regard the divestment of an unrelated business unit (Montgomery et al., 
1984). Therefore, it follows that the divested unit is in most cases unrelated to the core 
business of the divesting firm (e.g. Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Bergh, 1997; Bergh, Johnson 
and DeWitt, 2008). Besides low relatedness, divested business units are also characterized by 
low managerial attachment (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991). 
Another finding central to the extant research is that perhaps the most significant factor 
affecting divestment decisions is poor financial performance of either the parent firm or the 
business unit itself (e.g. Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991; Duhaime and Grant, 1984). This is 
also supported by various studies in the field of finance showing that in many cases the firms 
resorting to asset sales exhibit high leverage and/or poor performance (Lang, Poulsen and 
Stulz, 1995; Allen and McConnell, 1998), which often results in a financial distress (Brown et 
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al., 1994), i.e. high risk of bankruptcy. Desai and Jain (1999) show that firms often undertake 
divestments to get rid of poorly performing business units. 
Pulvino‟s (1998) study suggests that these financially distressed firms receive lower prices for 
their divestments than their financially unconstrained rivals, especially during an industry 
downturn. The seller‟s control over the bidding process is also weaker if it‟s financially 
distressed (Brau, Francis and Kohers, 2003). Therefore, it can be argued that as the parent‟s 
poor financial performance is a major antecedent of divestiture, the price of a divestment 
should also on average be lower than would be the price of a similar stand-alone company. 
A third aspect of divestitures is related to the bid process and deal structure itself. It has been 
argued that the nature of an acquisition of divested assets is friendlier than that of a normal 
takeover, and is also usually initiated by the selling firm (Datta et al., 2003) who deals with 
only one buyer (Sicherman and Pettway, 1992). This in turn results in a lower likelihood of 
an emerging bid competition, as the managerial resistance of the seller is likely to be low 
(Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993). 
Furthermore, by far the more used mode of payment for acquisitions of divestitures is cash 
instead of shares (Herz and Abahoonie, 1988; Faccio and Masulis, 2005). In divestments cash 
is desirable from both parties‟ perspective, as the sellers frequently are capital constrained 
and need the liquidity (as argued above), and the bidders want to avoid ownership dilution or 
creating a new blockholder of the selling company (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). 
Therefore, from the acquirer‟s perspective, there are a couple of factors related to 
divestments that make them different from acquisitions of stand-alone firms. The discussion 
above suggests the following common characteristics for divestitures2: 
1. Divested units are unrelated to the seller‟s business 
2. The parent company and/or the divested units have often experienced poor financial 
performance prior to the divestment 
                                               
2 That is, in most cases the divestiture is characterized by one or more of the given aspects, and not necessarily 
all of them hold in every case 
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3. Acquisitions of divestitures are in general friendlier than other acquisitions 
4. The method of payment is primarily cash 
However, one thing that should be kept in mind is that the aspects of the divested assets 
depend on the characteristics of the divesting parent, and therefore the buyer should always 
be aware of the actual reasons behind the divestment. For example, if the seller has an 
unrelated diversification strategy, it should rationally divest the most poorly performing 
business unit. On the other hand, if it follows a focused diversification strategy, the divested 
part should most likely be the one that is most unrelated to the seller‟s core business. These 
differences play a major role also when considered from the acquirer‟s point of view. 
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3 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses of this study, built on the findings from existing literature, are illustrated in 
the figure below (Figure 3: Hypotheses), and discussed in more detail below. 
Systematic acquirer
+
Acquisition performance
Acquisition price
-
Divestiture characteristic
Friendly, less
competed
Parent’s financial
performance
Relatedness to 
seller
-
-
When parent
financially distressed
H2
H3
+
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unrelated and buyer
related to divestment
H4
H5
 
Figure 3: Hypotheses 
3.1 Overall performance of divestiture acquisitions 
The overall suggestion of the literature review is that divestiture acquisitions should on 
average perform better than all M&As, due to several contributing factors. The first 
hypothesis essentially aggregates the various factors and predicts that the post-acquisition 
performance is higher when the acquired target is a divestment, as opposed to a full 
company. The following hypotheses 2 to 5 then refine hypothesis 1 by determining the 
individual effects of different factors. 
The hypothesized factors that improve post-acquisition performance of divestiture 
acquisitions can basically be divided in two broad groups. Firstly, the relative price of 
divested assets should be lower than price of full companies (hypotheses 2 and 3). Second, 
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acquiring divestments from parents operating in a different industry than the divested assets 
creates value potential due to improvement of asset efficiency as well as sharing 
complementary resources (hypothesis 4). In addition to these factors, also the effect of 
systematic acquisition behavior of the buyer is studied (hypothesis 5). 
Also one possible reason for above-normal performance of acquisitions of divested assets is 
that in these cases the acquirer can better target the exact assets that fit its specific needs. In 
contrast, when acquiring a stand-alone firm, the target most likely includes a lot more assets 
that are useless to the acquirer. (MacFayden, 2008) 
Friendliness of the negotiation process of divestiture acquisitions can also have a positive 
effect on the retention of the target‟s top executives (Walsh, 1989; Lubatkin et al., 1999; 
Krug and Hegarty, 2001), which in turn has been shown to increase the post-acquisition 
performance (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Bergh, 2001). 
The seller and buyer both prefer cash as the mode of payment for divestiture acquisitions 
(Faccio and Masulis, 2005), and cash paid acquisitions have been shown to perform better 
than stock deals in the long run (Loughran and Vijh, 1999). Therefore, as cash is the primary 
mode of payment for acquisitions of divested assets, this could also have a positive effect on 
the long-term performance compared to all acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 1 is the “base case” of the study, and is defined as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: On average, the post-acquisition performance of divestiture acquisitions is better than 
“regular” acquisitions. 
3.2 Deal value 
The effect of deal value on acquisition performance is rather straightforward. The basic 
premise is that acquisitions of similar assets are more profitable for the acquirer when the 
price of those assets is lower, ceteris paribus (Schoenberg, 2003). This means that the lower 
the relative deal price of an acquisition is, the better its performance should be. Relative deal 
price can be measured by transaction multiples such as price/sales or price/book value. 
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There are various factors that can contribute to the price of divestitures compared to other 
acquisitions. Divestiture acquisitions are usually considered friendlier deals than M&As in 
general (Datta et al., 2003), and often have only one potential buyer (Sicherman and Pettway, 
1992). Essentially, the buyer can be thought of “doing a favor” for the seller, since the buyer 
helps the seller get rid of possibly unwanted assets and improve its performance. Therefore, 
also the emergence of a bid competition should be less likely in divestiture acquisitions and 
the overall price lower. Also when the seller is financially distressed, its control over the bid 
process and bargaining power are weaker (Brau et al., 2003; Sicherman and Pettway, 1992), 
which can further decrease the transaction price. There is also some evidence that often the 
seller is not even very interested in managing the asset sale properly, and this carelessness 
may also decrease the price significantly (MacFayden, 2008). 
Acquisition price can also be moderated by information asymmetries between the buyer, the 
seller, and the target. It can be asserted that there exists a price discount on a business unit of 
a highly diversified company. This is because of lack of business unit level financial data and 
subsequent uncertainties in predicting the value of a single segment (King et al., 2004), which 
risk is then compensated by a discount in the target value. This discount should most benefit 
a related acquirer, who has better knowledge of the target‟s business and can therefore better 
determine the actual value (Capron and Shen, 2007). 
Thus, hypothesis 2 predicts the following: 
Hypothesis 2: The relative deal price of divestiture acquisitions is low, and consequently their acquisition 
performance is higher. 
3.3 Financial distress of divesting parent 
Another case of improved acquisition performance, partly related to acquisition price, is 
when the divesting parent company itself has exhibited poor financial performance and a 
high level of debt prior to the divestiture. These issues are also major reasons for corporate 
restructuring (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991; Johnson, 1996; Allen and McConnell, 1998). A 
financially constrained parent may have to resort to a “fire sale”: In order to quickly gain 
needed liquidity to cover its upcoming debt payments and avoid bankruptcy, the divesting 
firm has to sell the assets at a discount to their actual value (Pulvino, 1998). Therefore, 
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acquiring a divestiture from a financially distressed firm results in a lower acquisition price, 
which, as argued above, has a significant effect on the post-acquisition value potential. This 
should be even more noteworthy when the selling company has its major operations in one 
or more declining industries (Bergh and Lawless, 1998; Pangarkar and Lie, 2004). 
It is also possible that a financially distressed parent has been unable to finance even NPV 
positive projects of the target unit due to liquidity constraints. This results in poor asset 
efficiency of the target, which a financially solid acquirer can improve. Therefore, there is a 
possibility of a distinct financial synergy between the target and buyer (Fluck and Lynch, 
1999). 
This rationale leads to hypothesis 3, which is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Post-acquisition performance of divestiture acquisitions is improved when the target’s parent 
is financially distressed prior to the divestment. 
3.4 Change in relatedness 
One strong hypothesis relates to the difference in relatedness between the acquirer, the 
divesting firm, and the divested assets. Research shows that divested business units are 
usually not related to the core business of the divesting company (e.g. Hoskisson and Turk, 
1990; Bergh, 1997) and are characterized by low managerial attachment (Duhaime and Grant, 
1984; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991). The acquirer, however, is usually a less diversified 
company operating in an industry or business related to the target business unit‟s 
(Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991), i.e. the acquisitions are usually horizontal. Also John and 
Ofek (1995) show that a major motivation for divestitures is that they increase the seller‟s 
focus and that the divested assets have higher value potential to a related buyer than to the 
seller. 
The situation above should have an effect on performance since it creates significant 
possibilities for transfer of complementary resources, which has been shown to have a 
positive effect on post-acquisition performance (Capron and Pistre, 2002; Harrison et al., 
1991; 2001). For example, in the focal software industry the acquirer can transfer its software 
development and managerial resources to the target, and the target can transfer its industry-
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specific expertise and distribution channel resources to the acquirer. It is also possible that 
the target assets are previously inefficiently managed, since the seller probably doesn‟t have 
the necessary software competencies. In this case the related acquirer can also use its better 
knowledge of the target‟s business in improving the efficiency of its specialized assets 
(Capron, Mitchell and Swaminathan 2001; Karim, 2006). This is especially true in cases where 
the unit is divested due to its poor performance compared to its industry average, which is 
also one of the main reasons for divestitures (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991). 
Hypothesis 4 predicts the effect of the above relationship as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Post-acquisition performance of divestiture acquisitions is improved when the target is less 
related to the original parent than to the acquirer. 
The above hypothesis can also be illustrated as a figure (Figure 4: Illustration of difference in 
relatedness). It basically states that the acquisition performance should be greater when B > 
A. 
Original parent
(Divests the target)
Acquirer
(Acquires the target)
Target
(Divested assets)
A = Parent-to-target
similarity
B = Acquirer-to-
target similarity
Divestment
Acquisition
 
Figure 4: Illustration of difference in relatedness 
3.5 Strategic acquirer 
The final hypothesis considers the acquisitions from a longer term acquisition program 
perspective, and builds on recent findings on the pacing of acquisitions. When acquisitions 
are evenly paced and tied to a longer term strategic acquisition program, the acquirer‟s long-
term performance is significantly better (Laamanen and Keil, 2008). 
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The performance differences can mostly be attributed to organizational learning effects from 
previous effects, as well as time compression diseconomies. Although more acquisitions 
would in general result in more learning, if these acquisitions are compressed into a relatively 
small time frame, the organization cannot digest all the acquired new companies. Also when 
the acquisitions are made in a systematic manner, it is more likely an indicator that the 
acquisitions are more thoroughly planned. 
After the first few acquisitions, also prior acquisition experience increases post-acquisition 
performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), especially when the targets are somewhat 
similar to each other and are acquired at a steady pace (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; 
Hayward, 2002). 
Therefore, a clear indicator of strategic acquirer is a firm that has a low variability of 
acquisition activity between years. Similarly, a high variability indicates that the acquirer 
behaves less systematically and more “at a whim” when new opportunities present 
themselves. This is also the definition of strategic and ad hoc acquirers used in this study, and 
results in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The post-acquisition performance of “strategic” acquirers is better than “ad hoc” acquirers. 
Note that the fifth hypothesis diverts from the rest of the hypotheses to some extent. 
Essentially, it doesn‟t specifically consider divestiture acquisitions. This is a necessary 
distinction, since the studied acquisition programs are very likely to contain both divestiture 
and regular acquisitions. Moreover, one possible strength of successful programs can even be 
heterogeneity of the targets (including both stand-alone firms and divestments), since this 
can e.g. facilitate a higher amount of gained acquisition experience from the more diverse set 
of transactions. However, in the scope of this study the difference regarding the distribution 
of targets is not studied in more detail. 
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4 Methodology 
This chapter describes in detail the methodology used in the study, including construction of 
the sample, as well as dependent, independent and control variables. 
4.1 Sample 
The sample used in this study was constructed first by including all acquisitions that matched 
the following criteria: 
1. Acquisition was announced between January 1st, 1988 and December 31st, 2005 and 
completed (i.e. offer was not withdrawn after announcement) 
2. The acquisition resulted in the acquirer owning a majority (over 50% stake) of the 
target firm 
3. Acquirer was a public, US based company at time of acquisition 
4. Acquirer‟s primary SIC number was between 7371 and 7379 at time of acquisition 
Time frame of the first criterion was included in order to obtain a large enough sample for 
the study. A large majority of the acquisitions in the sample date to the years 1999-2000 due 
to the dot-com boom and the relatively young age of the software industry. In order to offset 
this, a relatively early starting date of 19883 was chosen. The dot-com era was not left out of 
the sample, since it most likely includes many “ad hoc” acquirers that are one major group of 
interest in this study, and dropping this period would have significantly decreased the sample 
size. However, the possible bias resulting from this period is taken into account when 
constructing the variables and interpreting results. The date of acquisition announcement was 
chosen as the actual observation under study. This decision ensured that there was minimal 
public information about the acquisition prior to the observation day so the market had not 
yet reacted to the event. 
                                               
3 Many software companies didn‟t go public until mid-1980s; e.g. Microsoft Corporation‟s IPO was in 1986, 
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As the purpose is to study post-acquisition performance using market based measures, the 
second criterion was needed to ensure availability of all the required data, since stock market 
data naturally exists only for public firms. Furthermore, some required variables are also 
based on accounting data, which is usually much more scarcely available for non-US 
companies, especially during the earlier years of the used time frame. 
The third restriction was imposed in order to limit the sample to software industry only. The 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code is a four digit measure of a firm‟s primary and 
secondary industries, and can be used to classify firms according to their business activities. 
There exists a fair amount of ambiguity regarding the actual definition of a software company 
(Messerschmitt and Szyperski, 2003: 26). Therefore, the stand taken in this paper is fairly 
neutral. The sample was constructed from all firms for which the first three digits of the 
primary SIC code is 737 (SIC group “Services – Computer programming, data processing, 
etc.”). The included SIC codes and their descriptions are listed in a table below (Table 1: 
Acquirer SIC codes included in the sample). The SIC codes marked with grey background 
were only included after further inspection, as described below. 
Narrowing the sample using the four criteria described above resulted in a sample of 7370 
acquisitions. After this, the sample was narrowed further and split in two research groups. 
The first group consisted of especially active acquirers of divestitures, and included 30 firms 
for which the percentage of divestiture acquisitions from all acquisitions was the highest, and 
which had acquired at least 10 firms during the study period. The second group was the 
opposite with 30 firms that had acquired relatively least divestitures compared to all 
acquisitions, but which also had acquired at least 10 firms, thus including active acquirers of 
mostly stand-alone firms. 
The above limitation was added in order to include only active acquirers and thus enable 
studying larger scale acquisition programs. Many of the constructs in the study consider 
multiple acquisitions made during a longer time period, and are thus only feasible for active 
acquirers. After these limitations, the sample was reduced to a size of 1223 acquisitions by 
the 60 focal firms. 
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Table 1: Acquirer SIC codes included in the sample  
SIC Code Description 
7371 Computer programming services 
7372 Prepackaged software 
7373 Computer integrated systems design 
7374 Computer processing and data preparation 
and processing services 
7375 Information retrieval services 
7376 Computer facilities management services 
7377 Computer rental and leasing 
7378 Computer maintenance and repair 
7379 Computer related services, not elsewhere 
classified 
SIC codes 7376-7378 (marked with grey background) are not strictly software related 
businesses. Before including any firm that had one of these as their primary SIC code, it was 
made sure that the firm had at least two other SIC codes between 7371-7375, or 7379 as 
secondary SIC codes. This was done in order to ensure that all the firms have software 
development as a large part of their operations. No firms were eliminated due to this 
restriction. 
4.2 Data collection 
The data used in this study was primarily collected from two sources. First of all, data 
regarding single acquisitions was obtained from the Thomson SDC Platinum database. SDC 
has fairly comprehensive details on historical acquisitions and as such was regarded as a 
suitable source for the data. Furthermore, SDC is a well-known product and has been 
utilized in a number of existing studies on M&As (e.g. Hayward, 2002; Finkelstein and 
Haleblian, 2002). 
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In addition, financial information such as accounting and share price data on individual firms 
was obtained from the Thomson Datastream Advance database. Also other financial data 
such as market indices and dividend payment history were acquired from this database. Some 
financial data missing from Datastream was also added from company 10-K (annual report) 
filings obtained from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) EDGAR database. 
After the acquisition data was collected, the amount of acquisitions for each firm was 
calculated. At this point also data for firms that had changed names during the study period 
was combined. This was done mostly manually by comparing the firms‟ CUSIP codes, 
names, and in some unclear cases also historical news found on the Internet. The 
consolidated list was then used to select the two aforementioned sample groups, namely 
active acquirers of divestitures and active acquirers of stand-alone firms. Although it is likely 
that some name changes in the sample might have been overlooked, this should not 
significantly affect the sample composition. 
4.3 Data structuring and analysis 
After all the data was gathered, two different models were built based on the data. First, all 
the collected data was collected into a database of single acquisition observations. This 
structure was used to study the short-term performance effects of individual acquisitions. 
Second, a panel structure – also called a cross-sectional time-series structure – was 
constructed by first aggregating all yearly data for each company into yearly panels. In other 
words, acquisition activity by a single company was studied on a yearly basis, rather than as 
individual acquisition observations. The model was also constructed to use a moving three 
year observation window, which included the focal year and previous two years (Figure 5: 
Structure of the panel model). The post-acquisition performance was measured as market 
value change three years after the observation window. Idea behind the panel model is that it 
gives a long-term view of the company‟s activities, and measures the long-term effects of 
these activities on the firm‟s performance. 
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Year 0Year -1Year -2 Year 3
Focal year
Observation period
Measure: market value
change 3 years after the 
end of focal year
 
Figure 5: Structure of the panel model 
First analysis of the data was done by splitting the sample into various subgroups of interest. 
The difference in mean returns between the subgroups was then analyzed statistically using 
single-sample and two-sample t-tests. 
Finally, the models were analyzed separately using multivariate regression. For the short-term 
model, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimated regression was used. The panel model was 
analyzed using a random effects regression model with generalized least squares (GLS) 
estimation. An advantage of the random effects model is that in the panel model it 
automatically moderates for effects that are not controlled both between panels (firms) and 
between years. In other words, it to some extent automatically controls for the effect of 
variables that are not included in the model. 
4.4 Dependent variables 
In the study, two dependent variables were constructed, one for each model. Both dependent 
variables measure the change in a firm‟s market value, since market-based measures are 
usually considered fairly good indicators of a firm‟s performance. Another possible 
dependent variable for the long-term model would have been the acquirer‟s accounting 
profitability, e.g. net income margin or ROIC. However, accounting based measures are not 
necessarily a very good indicator of post-acquisition performance. The measures can be 
calculated in many ways, and firm managers can also to some extent manipulate the 
accounting figures. Therefore, accounting measures might not reflect the firm‟s true 
performance, and may also be incomparable between different firms or even the same firm at 
different years. 
The dependent variables used in this study are described in detail below. 
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4.4.1 Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
The first dependent variable was constructed using the event study methodology, and it was 
used in the short-term models. An event study measures the short term changes in a firm‟s 
stock price surrounding a specific event. The methodology determines if the event has 
resulted in any returns in excess of the normal market return, i.e. “abnormal” returns. The 
impact of the event on the firm‟s value can then be assessed by aggregating the daily 
abnormal returns to the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the defined event period. 
(MacKinlay, 1997). 
The main assumption behind the event study method is that stock markets are efficient. That 
is, all new information regarding a company should be almost immediately incorporated in its 
share price, and this change should accurately reflect the actual change in the firm‟s value due 
to the event (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). 
The cumulative abnormal returns in this study were calculated following the procedure 
described by MacKinlay (1997). The actual event under study was the day when the 
acquisition was first announced, since this is the moment when information regarding an 
acquisition becomes publicly available. The event window used in the study was chosen as 5 
days before and after the announcement day, meaning that the abnormal returns were 
calculated from the time period beginning 5 days prior to and ending 5 days after the 
announcement, with the announcement day as day 0. Length of the event window was 
chosen to answer the concerns raised by McWilliams and Siegel (1997). The main reasoning 
for a short event window is that choosing a longer window increases the probability of 
confounding effects4 during the event window, and these effects would bias the abnormal 
returns. Choosing a longer event window would also be contradictory to the methodology‟s 
main assumption of market efficiency, since the efficient market hypothesis assumes that the 
new information is reflected in the stock price almost instantaneously. This assumption is 
also supported by various studies (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Ryngaert and Netter, 1990). 
                                               
4 Confounding effects can be for example declaration of dividends payment, earnings announcements, 
regulative changes, changes in key executives, etc. 
Methodology   
 
 
 
44 
Abnormal returns are returns in excess of normal returns that would have occurred if the 
event had never taken place. In this study the normal returns were measured using the 
market model, which relates a stock‟s return to the return of a market index or portfolio 
during the same period. The index used in this study is the NASDAQ Composite Index. 
This index was chosen since all the firms under study are high-tech software companies, and 
as such their share price correlates most strongly with the NASDAQ index and thus this 
index best explains changes in the market value. 
The return of a security i can be calculated using the market model as follows (calculation 
based on methodology description by MacKinlay, 1997): 
itmtiiit RR   ,  (1) 
where itR  and mtR  are the returns of security i and the market index m at time t; i  and i  
are the parameters of the market model for the security i, and it  is the disturbance term. 
The returns are calculated from daily stock prices and market index by using the formulas: 
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where itp  and )1( tip  are the closing prices of security i on day t and day t-1, respectively. 
Similarly tI  and )1( tI  are the closing values of the market index.  
Next, the parameters i  and i  from equation (1) are estimated by the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method over an estimation window. Estimation window is the time period 
prior to the event window that is used to measure the parameters, and in this study it was set 
to cover the time span of 220 to 6 days prior to the event. It is customary that the estimation 
and event windows do not overlap, in order to eliminate the effect of the event under study 
in the calculation of i  and i . 
Similarly to MacKinlay (1997), returns are indexed in event time by , using 0  as the 
event day, 1T  to 12  T  as the event window, and 0T  to 11  T  as the 
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estimation window. 1L  and 2L  denote the lengths of the estimation window and event 
window, respectively. The timeline of an event is illustrated in the figure below (Figure 6: 
Timeline of CAR calculation). 
T0 T1 T2-1
0 +5d-5d-220d
Estimation window (L1): -220d…-6d
(used to calculate β)
Event window (L2): -5d…+5d
(used to measure CAR)
Acquisition announcement: Day 0
 
Figure 6: Timeline of CAR calculation 
Now the parameters can be calculated as 
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After this, the obtained parameters can be used to calculate the abnormal returns at event 
time   as 
  miiii RRAR
ˆˆ  . (8) 
Thus, the cumulative abnormal return of a single event during the event window 1T  to 
12  T  is 
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Although the event study method is a widely used, fairly robust and proven research method, 
it still has some drawbacks. The main downside of an event study in measuring the 
performance of M&As is that it doesn‟t actually measure the true value of an acquisition, but 
rather the outside investors‟ reassessment of the acquiring firm‟s business. Also the 
perspective of event studies is on the short-term shareholder wealth gains, instead of the 
company‟s true long-term market performance. 
It is likely that there are cases when the short-term change in stock price due to an 
acquisition does not reflect the actual change in the acquiring firm‟s true long-term value, but 
some other factor. For example, Sicherman and Pettway (1992) studied acquisitions of 
divested assets and found that in these cases the impact on share price was most positive 
when the transaction price was revealed at the time of acquisition announcement. It can be 
argued that whether or not a firm announces the transaction price does not actually change 
the true value of an acquisition, so in perfectly efficient markets also the stock price response 
should be equal in both cases. In this case the stock price change really reflects two issues. 
Firstly, there is a lack of information regarding the real transaction price, and this 
information asymmetry risk is discounted in the stock price. Secondly, it is also possible that 
managers do not wish to disclose price information when they feel that the price is too high, 
and therefore markets react to price disclosures as an indication of higher managerial 
confidence. This illustrates the difficulty of assessing acquisition performance by merely 
looking at short-term abnormal returns. 
The above argument is brought out by Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson (2003) who state that 
at the time of acquisition announcement, three different pieces of information affect the 
stock market valuation: Stand-alone values of the target and the bidder, potential synergies in 
their combination, and bidder overpayment. It is often impossible to separate the effects of 
each, and thus inferring the true meaning of the stock market‟s reaction is extremely difficult, 
if not impossible. 
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Consider the following example: The stock market has for a longer period of time prior to 
the announcement anticipated that firm A will acquire firm B; that the price of the 
acquisition will be approximately $10 million; and that the synergistic net value potential 
from combining the two firms is around $20 million. Thus, the market value of firm A 
should already reflect this assumption, and be up by around $10 million ($20m - $10m). 
However, at the time of acquisition announcement the disclosed acquisition price is $15 
million instead of $10 million. The market reacts to its previous undervaluation of the 
transaction cost, and the returns at announcement are negative, although the net value 
potential of the acquisition is still positive $5 million (synergistic value of $20m – acquisition 
price of $15m). The above example is very simplified and only one possible case of many, 
but still illustrates the difficulty in assessing the true value of the acquisition purely from 
short-term stock reactions. 
4.4.2 Long-term market performance 
For the above reasons, in this study the longer term value implication of acquisition activity 
was measured by the panel models. In the panel model, the event study method was not 
applicable because the panel model did not consider individual acquisitions separately, but 
instead the observations were grouped on a yearly basis for each firm. The panel model also 
took a longer time perspective, with a three year moving time window of company behavior. 
The long-term perspective was also reflected in the dependent variable, which in the panel 
model was the acquirer‟s long-term market performance. It was calculated as the percentage 
change in the firms‟ share price three years after the acquisition period. The share prices were 
also adjusted by changes in the NASDAQ Composite Index during the time period, and all 
paid dividends during the time were taken into account by adding them to the value. If the 
firm disappeared from the sample during the observation period due to e.g. bankruptcy or 
the firm itself getting acquired, the last available stock price was used instead, in order to 
minimize potential survivor bias. 
Using the firm‟s change in market value three years instead of instantly after the observation 
period better reflects the acquisition program‟s actual contribution to the acquirer‟s 
performance and cash flows. It takes time to integrate the companies and thus their true 
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effect on the acquirer‟s cash flows is not visible until after a significant period of time. 
Therefore, a longer term dependent variable should better reflect the performance of 
programs of multiple acquisitions instead of individual acquisitions. 
4.5 Independent variables 
Since the structures of the short-term and long-term models differ from each other, also the 
used variables were constructed differently for the different models. In this section, they are 
described by variable, and in each case the constructions in both models are explained. 
4.5.1 Divestment 
Whether the target for acquisition is a divestment or a stand-alone company is the primary 
subject of research in this paper. In the short-term model, in order to distinguish whether an 
acquisition was a divestment, a binary variable was included. This variable was directly based 
on SDC database‟s divesture flag, and took the value 1 if the case was a divestment and 0 
otherwise. 
In the long-term model, the variable was constructed as the percentage of divestitures from 
all acquisitions during the three year observation window. If the amount of all acquisitions 
was zero during the period, also the variable was set to 0%. 
4.5.2 Price-to-sales multiple 
In the short-term model, the price-to-sales multiple as reported by SDC was used as a 
measure of the acquisition‟s relative value. Statistical regression assumes that the used 
variables are normally distributed, and this requirement was fulfilled by making a logarithmic 
transformation of the actual value in the regression model. 
The main problem is that for a majority of observations this variable was unavailable for two 
reasons. First of all, quite often the acquirer does not reveal the transaction price, especially 
when the acquisition is relatively small as is often the case with divestiture acquisitions. 
Secondly, also sales figures are often lacking either because they are not reported (e.g. when 
the target is a private company or a subsidiary), or because sales figures are simply not 
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applicable to the target, e.g. if the target consists of some physical assets for which sales can‟t 
even be measured. 
Therefore, including this variable decreases the sample size quite substantially. It also 
presents a possibility of biased results, since it is likely that the sales figures and transaction 
prices are most often reported for certain types of acquisitions. In order to keep the sample 
size in other models sufficiently large, this variable was only used in one regression model. 
Also other measures of relative deal value, such as the price-to-book value multiple were 
considered. However, the same problems regarding data availability are applicable to other 
ratios as well, and therefore they were left out of the study. 
Due to the aforementioned restriction, a measure for multiple acquisitions‟ relative value 
could not be unambiguously calculated, and the measure was therefore not used in the panel 
model. For example, if a firm made 6 acquisitions during the three year observation period, 
and the transaction price was disclosed for only half of these acquisitions, there is no reliable 
way of calculating the actual average deal value for this period. Average size of the 
acquisitions could have been measured to some extent by changes in the acquirer‟s assets, 
but this still does not tell how much the acquirer paid for the targets. 
4.5.3 Parent’s financial distress 
In order to measure the divesting parent‟s financial distress prior to the divestment in the 
short-term models, a new binary variable was created. This variable took the value 1 if the 
parent was distressed and 0 otherwise. Financial distress was measured similarly to Bruton et 
al. (1994): a firm was considered distressed if both its net income and return on invested 
capital had declined during the two consecutive years before the focal year. In addition, firms 
whose net income and return on invested capital had been negative during the prior two 
years were also included. 
A significant drawback of this variable is that financial data on the divested asset‟s ultimate 
parent was available only for public divestors. Since majority of the divesting firms are 
actually private companies, this restriction significantly decreases the sample size. In addition, 
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it may result in a bias in results considering that public and private firms may have differing 
motivations for divesting and in general divest different kinds of assets. 
Due to the abovementioned restriction on data availability, a similar strategy as with the 
price-to-sales variable was used, namely, that this variable was only included in one 
regression model. This made testing the hypothesis possible without decreasing the sample 
size for other hypotheses. 
In the panel model, the variable was constructed as the percentage of divested assets bought 
from distressed divesting parents from total acquisitions during the three year window. 
Similarly to the divestiture variable, if there were no acquisitions during the observation 
period, the percentage was set to zero. 
4.5.4 Change in relatedness 
The variable “change in relatedness” was constructed in order to measure whether there is an 
effect on acquisition performance when there are differences between the acquirer-to-target 
and parent-to-target similarities, e.g. when the parent divests non-core assets and acquirer 
buys core-related assets. Relatedness between the target and the acquirer or parent was 
calculated from both parties‟ SIC codes using the same algorithm as Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999), which was defined as follows: 
1. Only the first six SIC codes of the two companies were taken into account 
2. First, the primary SIC codes of both companies were compared and points were 
given in the following manner: 
a. For an exact match (4 digits):  6 points 
b. For a 3-digit match: 4 points 
c. For a 2-digit match: 2 points 
3. Next, all other SIC codes were compared to the others, and they were given: 3 points 
for 4-digit match; 2 points for 3-digit match; and 1 point for 2-digit match 
4. The final score for a single acquisition was determined as the largest single similarity 
score awarded, thus ranging between 0 and 6. 
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After this, the overall change in relatedness was simply calculated as ptat RR  , where atR  is 
the acquirer-to-target and ptR  the parent-to-target relatedness. As the single relatedness 
scores ranges between [0, 6], the total change in relatedness score‟s range is [-6, 6]. Thus, a 
negative score denotes a decrease in relatedness (i.e. target is more related to the original 
parent than the new acquirer), whereas a positive score means that the relatedness improved 
after the acquisition. Note that the change in relatedness is only applicable to divestiture 
acquisitions, since for “regular” acquisitions the parent and target are the same entity (and 
thus the relatedness between them would always be 6). For this reason, the score was only 
used for divestiture acquisitions, and in other cases the difference score was set to zero. 
A continuous scale might not measure the studied phenomenon sufficiently well. To better 
separate the improved relatedness acquisitions from those where relatedness was not 
improved or even decreased, the hypothesis was also tested using a dichotomous variable. 
This variable received a value of 1 if the overall change in relatedness was 3 or more, and 0 
otherwise. 
In the panel model, the variable was constructed by first calculating the average change in 
relatedness for all divestiture acquisitions during the three year period. Then a binary variable 
for average improved relatedness was created. This variable received a value of 1 if the 
average relatedness change was 3 or more. If there were no divestiture acquisitions during the 
period, the variable was set to 0. 
4.5.5 Strategic acquirer 
The definition of a strategic acquirer corresponds to that first suggested by Vermeulen and 
Barkema (2002) and later employed by Laamanen and Keil (2008), which considers strategic 
acquirers as firms that undertake acquisitions at a regular pace. This variable was constructed 
by first calculating the standard deviation in the yearly acquisition count for each firm n 
during the whole time period (1988-2005) as 
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where N is the number of years during the time frame, jnx  is the amount of acquisitions for 
firm n on year j, and nx  is the average of all acquisitions per year for firm n. 
After this, the normalized standard deviation for each firm was calculated from equation (10) 
as n  divided by the total number of acquisitions over the whole study period. The whole 
population of firms was then split into two equally sized groups, and the firms with below-
median normalized standard deviations were designated “strategic” and the rest “ad hoc” 
acquirers. This division is quantified for each firm by a dichotomous variable which received 
the value 1 if that firm was a strategic acquirer. 
Since this variable looks at the whole study period between 1988 and 2005, it gives a true 
long term measure of the focal firm‟s behavior. The same variable was used for both the 
short-term CAR models and the long-term panel models, because the variable measures the 
acquirer‟s, not the acquisition‟s, characteristic and does not change over time. 
4.6 Control variables 
4.6.1 Acquirer size 
As a proxy for the acquiring company‟s size, acquirer‟s total assets were used as a control 
variable. It is assumed that acquisition performance is improved for larger companies, e.g. 
because they are less affected by the acquisition, better able to assimilate new firms, and have 
more established processes for conducting acquisitions. Similarly to the price-to-sales 
multiple, a logarithmic transformation was done prior to using the variable in the regression 
models, since otherwise it would have violated the normality assumption.  
In the short-term abnormal returns regression models, acquirer‟s size was obtained from 
SDC or EDGAR for each acquisition separately, whereas in the panel models the variable 
was defined as the acquirer‟s total assets in the beginning of the three-year observation 
window. The latter variable was chosen so that the variable is not affected by the acquisitions 
made during the window. 
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4.6.2 International acquisitions 
Multiple studies have shown that international acquisitions are on average more difficult to 
undertake due to e.g. cultural differences not only between firms, but also between the 
operating countries. This makes the integration of the firms even harder than in domestic 
mergers, which in turn lowers the value created from the acquisition (Olie, 1994). 
In order to control for cross-border acquisitions, a variable for international acquisitions was 
generated. For the short-term CAR models a simple binary variable was used and set to 1 for 
all acquisitions where the target was not based in the United States. In the panel models, the 
variable used was the percentage of international acquisitions from all acquisitions during the 
given time period. 
4.6.3 Public target 
Capron and Shen (2007) show that when the acquisition target is a public company, also the 
short-term abnormal returns are on average lower. This can mostly be attributed to the lower 
price of private targets. 
To control for this, a dichotomous variable was included in the short-term model, and this 
variable was given a value of 1 if the target company was public. In the panel model the 
variable was constructed as the proportion of public targets during the observation window. 
4.6.4 Competed acquisitions 
One possible factor decreasing acquisition performance is the emergence of bid competition, 
as competing bidders may drive the acquisition price up until it becomes only marginally 
profitable (Sirower, 1997). Thus, acquisitions with multiple potential buyers should on 
average perform worse than acquisitions with only one buyer. 
Due to this, a control variable for competed acquisitions was included. Similarly to the 
international acquisitions variable, bid competition was included as a binary variable for the 
short-term CAR models, and as the proportion of competed acquisitions during the 
observation period for the panel models. Competed acquisitions were defined as those with 
two or more potential buyers, as reported by SDC. 
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4.6.5 Method of payment 
Choice for the method of payment in acquisitions also has shown to affect long-term 
acquisition performance, with cash-financed acquisitions performing better than acquisitions 
paid by shares. This is due to the fact that managers tend to pay for acquisitions by shares 
mostly when they feel that their shares are overvalued, and by cash when undervalued. 
Therefore, cash payments should reflect acquiring managers‟ superior confidence regarding 
the post-acquisition performance. The study by Loughran and Vijh (1997) for example 
shows that the long-term performance of acquisitions paid primarily by cash was 62% above 
average. 
Method of payment was therefore included as a binary control variable, which was set to one 
if the acquisition was paid 100% by cash, and as the percentage of 100% cash of acquisitions 
during the observation period for the panel models. 
4.6.6 Transaction price disclosure 
Sicherman and Pettway (1992) show that in acquisitions of divested assets, the short-term 
returns are higher when price of the acquisition is revealed at time of the announcement. 
This reflects a discount for the risk resulting from information asymmetries, since the 
investors cannot discern the value of the acquisition when they are not certain of the price 
paid. It is also likely that managers on average tend to disclose the price more often for 
acquisitions that are not overpaid than for acquisitions where the price may have been too 
high. Also in this case the post-acquisition performance of acquisitions where price is 
disclosed should be higher. 
Disclosure of the transaction price was included in the short-term models as a binary variable 
which was set to 1 if the transaction price was known and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, a 
variable measuring the percentage of acquisitions where the price was disclosed was added to 
the panel models. 
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4.6.7 Acquirer sub-industry 
Inherent differences between some industries may also result in differential post-acquisition 
performance. In this study the firms all operate in the software industry, but come from 
various sub-industries. To control for this, a binary variable was created for all the sub-
industries under study as classified by the firms‟ primary SIC code (a total of 9 binary 
variables denoting SIC codes between 7371-7379). 
4.6.8 Pre-boom acquisitions 
Besides differences in the profitability of the firms‟ sub-industries, also the overall industry 
affects acquisition performance. In particular, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) show that before the 
stock market correction in March 2000, acquisitions in the software industry resulted in 
higher acquirer returns than after that time, measured by the short-term abnormal returns. 
A binary variable was included to control for this in the short-term model. The variable was 
assigned a value of 1 if the acquisition announcement took place prior to March 2000. In the 
panel model this was included as a binary variable which received a value of one if the focal 
year was 1999 or earlier. 
4.6.9 Amount of acquisitions and variability in acquisition rate 
When considering multiple acquisitions, the more acquisitions are undertaken in a shorter 
period of time, the worse the acquirer‟s long-term performance. This is due to the fact that a 
company cannot “digest” a large number of acquisitions in a shorter time frame. 
Furthermore, also a high variability in the acquisition rate affects the performance negatively, 
since this indicates a less systematic acquisition program. (Laamanen and Keil, 2008) 
Therefore, two additional control variables were included in the panel model: the total 
amount of acquisitions during the three year period, and the standard deviation in yearly 
acquisition amounts. The standard deviation was also normalized by a logarithmic 
transformation in order to fulfill the requirements of linear regression. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Sample description 
As described in the data selection chapter, the sample consisted of total 60 firms that had 
their primary SIC between 7371 and 7379. Furthermore, companies that had a secondary SIC 
between 7376 and 7378, also had to have two secondary SIC codes between 7371-7375 or 
7379. The overall distribution of acquisitions by the acquirer‟s primary SIC code is presented 
in the figure below. (Figure 7: Distribution of acquisitions by acquirer SIC code). It can be 
seen that the most active sub-industries were 7372 (Prepackaged software), 7374 (Computer 
processing and data preparation and processing services), and 7375 (Information retrieval 
services). 
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Figure 7: Distribution of acquisitions by acquirer SIC code 
When looking at the yearly acquisition activity during the study period (Figure 8: Timeline of 
acquisition activity by acquirer SIC code), the dot-com boom is clearly visible as a spike 
especially in 1998-1999. The stock market correction took place in March 2000, which 
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substantially decreased the availability of financing for the companies, and this can be seen as 
a very sharp drop in acquisition activity. 
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Figure 8: Timeline of acquisition activity by acquirer SIC code 
One factor that was used to divide the sample was whether the acquirer was “strategic” or 
“ad hoc”, based on the variability in their acquisition rates. As is expected, when looking at 
the yearly acquisition activity of these two groups, it is clear that the “ad hoc” acquirers were 
also those most contributing to the acquisition boom (Figure 9: Timeline of acquisition 
activity by acquirer classification). The overall trend of strategic acquirers remains relatively 
stable and slightly rising. 
A large majority of acquisitions that were made during the dot-com boom were value-
destroying, suggesting that they were not planned thoroughly. The fact that these acquisitions 
were mostly undertaken by the firms classified in this paper as ad hoc acquirers indicates that 
the constructed measure of ad hoc versus strategic acquirer is fairly valid. 
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Figure 9: Timeline of acquisition activity by acquirer classification 
5.2 Short-term abnormal returns models 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Summary of the included variables of the short-term models is presented in the table below 
(Table 2: Summary of short-term model variables). The dependent variable could not be 
calculated for 79 observations. This is because if the acquisition was made relatively soon 
after the firm went public, no meaningful alpha and beta coefficients could be determined, 
and hence no abnormal returns could be calculated. 
Table 2 shows that the mean CAR of the whole sample is very close to zero (-0.3%). 
However, it also hides a fairly large amount of variance, as is evident from the minimum and 
maximum values of -65.2% and 60.9%, respectively. The returns are also very normally 
distributed, as can be seen from the image below (Figure 10: CAR distribution histogram). 
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Table 2: Summary of short-term model variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CAR -5 to 5 days surrounding the announcement 1143 -0.003 0.110 -0.652 0.609
Target is a divestiture 1222 0.261 0.439 0 1
Price-to-sales multiple 212 26.227 214.145 0 3068.004
Normalized price-to-sales multiple 204 0.733 1.623 -4.510 8.029
Parent distressed 228 0.241 0.429 0 1
Change in relatedness (continuous) 1222 -1.327 2.685 -6 6
Change in relatedness (binary) 1222 0.126 0.332 0 1
Strategic acquirer 1222 0.570 0.495 0 1
Acquirer total assets 1222 2297.360 4668.579 5 33947.4
Normalized acquirer total assets 1222 6.185 1.884 1.609 10.433
International acquisition 1222 0.197 0.398 0 1
Acquisition financed by cash 1222 0.114 0.318 0 1
Competed acquisition 1222 0.007 0.086 0 1
Price disclosed at announcement 1222 0.458 0.498 0 1
Pre-March 2000 1222 0.639 0.480 0 1
Public target 1222 0.231 0.421 0 1  
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Figure 10: CAR distribution histogram 
Price-to-sales ratios were only available for observations where the acquisition price was 
disclosed, and the target‟s sales were reported (212 observations). Furthermore, price-to-sales 
ratios of zero were deleted when normalizing the variables, since they most likely represent 
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an error in the data. Parent distress could only be calculated for public targets which had 
sufficient financial data available (228 observations). 
Out of the 1,143 acquisitions for which the cumulative abnormal returns could be calculated, 
302 were acquisitions of divestitures and 841 were “regular” acquisitions, i.e. in the sample 
divestiture acquisitions account for approximately 25% of all acquisitions.  
One hypothesized reason for above-average performance of divestitures is their below-
average relative price. This general assumption is verified in the sample: The average price-to-
sales ratio of the whole sample was 11.8 (212 observations) and for divestiture acquisitions 
1.14 (46 observations). Even when limiting the data to only those cases where the price-to-
sales ratio was less than 10, the means were 2.01 for all (191 observations) and 1.14 when the 
target was a divestiture (46 observations). 
Another assumption underlying the hypotheses concerns the change in relatedness between 
the acquirer and target, and the original parent and target. When measured on a scale of -6 to 
6, the average change in relatedness in divestiture acquisitions was 0.75. This indicates that 
on average the relatedness improved in the transaction, i.e. divestors sold non-core assets, 
and acquirers bought core-related assets. However, the average change was fairly small so no 
major conclusions can be made based on this result. 
A simple descriptive analysis of the dependent variable was first done by dividing the 
acquisitions in two groups, divestiture acquisitions and others. Then the cumulative average 
abnormal returns were plotted -5 to +10 days surrounding the acquisition announcement 
date. The abnormal returns are illustrated below in a graph (Figure 11: Cumulative abnormal 
returns), which shows a difference in returns between the types of acquisitions. Acquisitions 
of divestments have on average resulted in positive short-term returns, whereas the returns 
of other acquisitions have been negative. 
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Figure 11: Cumulative abnormal returns 
From the figure it should be noted that the trends in abnormal returns level out quite quickly 
after the acquisition announcement, indicating that the stock market has at this point 
incorporated the event in the stock price. This finding is also backed by multiple studies, 
concluding that the majority of a stock price‟s adjustment to new unanticipated events occurs 
within a time frame between few hours to a couple of days after the announcement (e.g. 
McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Ryngaert and Netter, 1990). The dependent variable for the 
CAR models was chosen as -5 to +5 days surrounding the announcement, as the above 
figure illustrates that a longer time frame would not yield any additional insight. 
5.2.2 Subsample analysis 
First analysis of the short-term model was done by dividing the full sample into various sub-
groups. Then the subsamples were analyzed using a one-sample t-test, which tested if the 
average short-term abnormal returns of the subgroups were significantly different from zero. 
The results are summarized in the table below (Table 3: Single sample t-test analysis for 
CAR). 
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Firstly, the abnormal returns of all acquisitions in the sample are not significantly different 
from zero with a slightly negative mean return, which is in line with basically all of the 
existing research (e.g. Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004). However, the returns from 
acquisitions of full companies are both negative (mean -0.66%) and significantly lower than 
zero (p < 0.05), whereas acquisitions of divestments have resulted in positive returns (mean 
0.89%) which are significantly higher than zero (p < 0.05). These results support the first 
hypothesis. 
In order to study other factors of interest, the sample was further divided into smaller 
subsamples. The first subgroup consisted of those divestiture acquisitions where the original 
divesting parent was also public, the second of those where the parent was both public and 
financially distressed (corresponds to hypothesis 3), and the third of acquisitions where 
relatedness between target and the acquirer was better than originally between the target and 
its parent (hypothesis 4). The mean acquirer returns in these groups were higher than with all 
divestiture acquisitions (2.04%, 3.47% and 1.83%), and statistically significant. These results 
also give support to hypotheses 3 and 4. Table 3 also shows that the mean abnormal return 
of strategic acquirers is not significantly different from zero, indicating that in the short run 
the investors do not make a difference between the long-term acquisition activity of the 
acquirer, or are unable to make this difference. 
In order to check if the differences between the subgroups were also significant, the analysis 
was also complemented by running two-sample t-tests. The findings are summarized below 
(Table 4: Two sample t-test analysis for CAR). 
Table 3: Single sample t-test analysis for CAR 
Cases in 
sample
Mean abnormal 
return (Rn)
Std. Err. p(Rn < 0) p(Rn != 0) p(Rn > 0)
All acquisitions 1143 -0.25 % 0.003 0.217 0.435 0.783
Non-divestiture acquisitions 841 -0.66 % 0.004 0.047** 0.094* 0.953
Divestiture acquisitions
All 302 0.89 % 0.005 0.951 0.098* 0.049**
Parent public 155 2.04 % 0.008 0.994 0.011** 0.006***
Parent public and distressed 30 3.47 % 0.018 0.966 0.067* 0.034**
Improved fit ( ≥ 3) 96 1.83 % 0.009 0.976 0.049** 0.025**
Strategic acquirers 677 -0.17 % 0.004 0.317 0.634 0.683
NOTES:
Dependent variable: Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirer [-5, 5] days around announcement
p-values tell the probability that the null hypothesis (in parenthesis) should be rejected
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
Group
 
Results   
 
 
 
63 
Table 4: Two sample t-test analysis for CAR 
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The results show that returns from divestiture acquisitions were significantly higher than 
returns from regular acquisition (mean difference of 1.55%), and that divestiture acquisitions 
where the parent was public were significantly higher than with a non-public divestor (mean 
difference 2.38%). The other two subgroups also yielded higher average returns than their 
peer groups, but the difference was not statistically significant. However, also these 
acquisitions yield higher average returns than either all acquisitions, or all acquisitions of 
stand-alone companies, and this difference is statistically significant. On the whole, the 
results further support hypotheses 1, 3 and 4. However, the credibility of the above findings 
can be lessened to some extent due to the rather small sizes of the subsamples, especially in 
the case of distressed parents. 
5.2.3 Pairwise correlations 
Table (Table 5: CAR models pairwise correlations) below shows the pairwise correlations 
between the variables. Note that the first variable is the dependent variable, followed by 
independent variables (2 to 6), and finally control variables. 
The table shows that divestiture acquisition has the highest statistically significant correlation 
with the dependent variable. The correlations also give further support to the assumptions 
that the price of divestiture acquisitions is on average lower, and that the change in 
relatedness is improved. Interestingly, the figures also indicate that large companies and 
strategic acquirers bought on average more divestitures. It also shows that divestiture 
acquisitions were more often paid for by cash, as was expected. 
The pairwise correlations table also reveals some collinearity between the independent 
variables. Although no correlation coefficients are very high (>0.5), multicollinearity may still 
affect the results. Post-estimation tests were conducted after the regression analysis to check 
for the possible bias resulting from collinearity, and are presented after the regression results 
below. 
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Table 5: CAR models pairwise correlations 
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5.2.4 Regression analysis 
Finally, the hypotheses were tested by constructing regression models with the independent 
and control variables described in chapter 4. Results from these regressions are summarized 
in the table below (Table 6: Short-term CAR regression model results). 
Table 6: Short-term CAR regression model results 
Independent variable
Hypothesized 
direction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4b Model 5
Target is a divestiture + 0.021 0.073 0.056 0.022 0.019 0.021
(0.012)** (0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.013)** (0.050)** (0.023)**
Normalized price-to-sales multiple - 0.006
(0.366)
Parent distressed + 0.011
(0.535)
Change in relatedness (continuous) + -0.001 -0.001
(0.641) (0.633)
Change in relatedness (binary) + 0.004
(0.713)
Strategic acquirer + 0.009
(0.204)
Normalized acquirer total assets + -0.005 -0.009 -0.012 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.035)** (0.204) (0.052)** (0.036)** (0.035)** (0.021)**
International acquisition - 0.013 0.001 0.028 0.013 0.012 0.014
(0.134) (0.976) (0.145) (0.124) (0.140) (0.105)
Acquisition financed by cash + -0.002 -0.015 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.854) (0.466) (0.839) (0.862) (0.857) (0.812)
Competed acquisition - -0.009 0.001 0.003 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010
(0.825) (0.979) (0.954) (0.816) (0.833) (0.798)
Price disclosed at announcement + 0.000 (dropped) 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.954) (0.794) (0.932) (0.979) (0.970)
Pre-March 2000 + 0.001 -0.037 -0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.894) (0.063)* (0.721) (0.863) (0.919) (0.851)
Public target - -0.011 -0.025 (dropped) -0.010 -0.011 -0.010
(0.220) (0.189) (0.258) (0.208) (0.284)
Acquirer SIC 7371 ? -0.036 -0.018 -0.125 -0.036 -0.036 -0.039
(0.043)** (0.709) (0.007)*** (0.046)** (0.042)** (0.033)**
Acquirer SIC 7372 ? -0.027 -0.007 -0.130 -0.026 -0.027 -0.028
(0.070)* (0.8779 (0.002)*** (0.084)* (0.071)* (0.062)*
Acquirer SIC 7373 ? 0.010 -0.075 -0.077 0.010 0.009 0.010
(0.589) (0.195) (0.107) (0.556) (0.594) (0.576)
Acquirer SIC 7374 ? 0.001 0.018 -0.093 0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.931) (0.635) (0.024)** (0.895) (0.951) (0.967)
Acquirer SIC 7375 ? -0.003 0.017 -0.106 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.845) (0.690) (0.014)** (0.905) (0.838) (0.915)
Acquirer SIC 7376 ? -0.023 (dropped) -0.108 -0.022 -0.023 -0.025
(0.203) (0.018)** (0.220) (0.197) (0.175)
Acquirer SIC 7377 ? 0.019 (dropped) -0.042 0.020 0.019 0.016
(0.592) (0.615) (0.577) (0.600) (0.661)
Acquirer SIC 7378 ? (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Acquirer SIC 7379 ? (dropped) 0.057 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
(0.274)
Constant ? 0.031 0.069 0.141 0.028 0.032 0.029
(0.130) (0.333) (0.027)** (0.185) (0.126) (0.181)
Number of observations 1143 197 220 1143 1143 1143
NOTES:
Dependent variable: Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirer [-5, 5] days around announcement
P-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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The first regression model includes only the control variables and a binary variable for 
divestitures, and the further models add more independent variables. As described earlier, the 
independent variables for price-to-sales ratio and parent distressed were only included 
separately in their own models due to lack of data. Also in all models some control variables 
were dropped due to high levels of collinearity, and are marked as (dropped). 
The regression results show that in all models divestiture acquisitions have a positive effect 
on short-term returns for the acquirer. On average divestiture acquisitions have yielded 
approximately 2% higher cumulative stock market returns during the 11-day observation 
window. This effect is statistically significant at 5% level. In the two models with smaller 
samples, the results are even higher (7.3% and 5.6%) and significant at 1% level. These 
results strongly support hypothesis 1, stating that the post-acquisition performance of 
divestiture acquisitions is on average better than performance of acquisitions of stand-alone 
firms. 
In model 2, sign of the effect of relative deal price is contrary to the hypothesis and logic 
(predicting higher returns when the paid price was higher), but the coefficient is very small 
and not statistically significant. On the other hand, the correlation between returns and price-
to-sales multiple is in the hypothesized direction but statistically insignificant. Therefore, the 
model does not support hypothesis 2. Although the price-to-sales ratio of divestiture 
acquisitions is on average lower, it does not seem to have a large impact on the returns by 
itself. It can also indicate that the acquisition price has on average been “correct” from the 
investors‟ point of view. The results were also tested after omitting one possible outlier, and 
the results were similar. 
The third model tests the acquisition‟s effect on returns when the parent is distressed. The 
sign of the coefficient is in the hypothesized direction, but not statistically significant. The 
model was also tested with a sample of only divestiture acquisitions, and the results were 
similar (not reported). Thus, the model does not support hypothesis 3. 
Interestingly, however, in models 2 and 3 the effect of divestiture acquisition is significantly 
higher. This indicates that even though the price-to-sales and parent distress variables 
themselves do not seem to affect post-acquisition performance, they have a moderating 
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effect through the limitations they cause in the sample. Specifically, it seems that divestiture 
acquisitions have a higher return when (i) the price of a divestment is disclosed and it is a 
business unit with measurable sales (i.e. subsidiary), and (ii) the divestor is a public company. 
Results for model 4a show that change in relatedness has a negligibly small and statistically 
insignificant effect on acquisition returns. Furthermore, besides a continuous variable ranging 
from -6 to 6, change in relatedness was also measured separately by a dichotomous variable 
that got value 1 if the change in relatedness was equal to or higher than 3. The results are 
reported in model 4b and are similar to those of model 4a. Hypothesis 4 receives no support 
from these models. 
The last model tests if the returns are affected when the acquisition is done by a strategic 
acquirer. The results are not statistically significant, and therefore do not support hypothesis 
5. This indicates that when assessing the value of an acquisition in short term, the investors 
in general don‟t pay attention to the long term rate of acquisitions done by the acquirer. 
5.2.5 Short-term regression post-estimation 
After the regression analysis, White‟s test for heteroskedasticity was used to estimate variance 
of the residuals (White, 1980). The tests show that the overall regression residuals are 
homoskedastic (p < 0.01). 
The regression model was also tested for multicollinearity by calculating variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) for the independent variables (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson and Tatham, 
2005). The VIF estimation results are summarized in table below (Table 7: Variance inflation 
factors for the short-term model). The table shows that no major multicollinearity was 
present in the regression models, since VIF values of >10 are considered statistically 
significant. The highest VIF values were those of the SIC variables, which could be expected 
since they measure the same factor (acquirer sub-industry) and are by nature correlated with 
each other. That is, a firm can only belong into one sub-industry, and thus the binary 
variables for other SIC codes automatically receive the value zero. 
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Table 7: Variance inflation factors for the short-term model 
Models 1, 4, 5 Model 2 Model 3
Acquirer SIC 7371 2.2 3.2 3.2
Acquirer SIC 7372 4.1 5.4 5.4
Acquirer SIC 7373 2.2 2.1 2.6
Acquirer SIC 7374 4.0 3.7 7.6
Acquirer SIC 7375 3.9 3.6 5.1
Acquirer SIC 7376 2.4 N/A 4.6
Acquirer SIC 7377 1.2 N/A 1.3
Acquirer SIC 7379 N/A 2.4 N/A
Acquisition financed by cash 1.3 1.2 1.3
Change in relatedness (cont.) 1.4 N/A N/A
Competed acquisition 1.1 1.1 1.1
International acquisition 1.1 1.1 1.2
Normalized price-to-sales multiple N/A 1.5 N/A
Normalized total assets 1.6 2.0 1.9
Parent distressed N/A N/A 1.1
Pre-March 2000 1.4 1.3 1.5
Price disclosed at announcement 1.4 N/A 1.6
Strategic acquirer 1.2 N/A N/A
Target is a divestiture 1.6 1.5 1.3
Target/parent public 1.5 1.2 N/A
Mean VIF 2.0 2.2 2.7
NOTES:
VIF > 10 is statistically significant at 5%
Independent variable
VIF
 
5.3 Long-term performance models 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The table below (Table 8: Summary of variables in the panel model) presents summary 
statistics for the included variables. The total amount of firm-year pairs was 583. However, 
since a firm has to have existed for at least 3 years in order to calculate variables describing 
the moving window, the amount of observations for most of the variables decreased to 472. 
Table 8: Summary of variables in the panel model 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Percentage change in market value 3 years after window 583 0.464 2.366 -7.469 24.383
Percentage of divestiture acquisitions (3 yrs) 472 0.256 0.314 0 1
Percentage of acquisitions with distressed parent (3 yrs) 472 0.028 0.097 0 1
Acquisitions with improved average relatedness (3 yrs) 472 0.159 0.366 0 1
Strategic acquirer 583 0.621 0.486 0 1
Amount of acquisitions (3 yrs) 472 6.044 6.254 0 57
Normalized standard deviation of acquisition rate (3 yrs) 472 -0.023 1.238 -2.303 2.683
Normalized acquirer total assets before window 434 12.441 1.965 7.182 19.156
Percentage of international acquisitions (3 yrs) 472 0.156 0.248 0 1
Percentage of competed acquisitions (3 yrs) 472 0.008 0.046 0 0.5
Percentage of acquisitions with disclosed price (3 yrs) 472 0.444 0.372 0 1
Percentage of public targets (3 yrs) 472 0.214 0.244 0 1
Percentage of acquisitions financed by cash (3 yrs) 472 0.109 0.192 0 1
Pre-2000 window 583 0.612 0.488 0 1
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The mean three-year market value change in the sample is 46.4%, which is fairly consistent 
with the relatively long time frame of 3 years, especially since during the included time span 
the economy has for the most part been growing. The minimum and maximum values are 
more extreme, especially the maximum market value increase of 2438%. However, the 
amount of extreme observations was low, with majority of the observations being normally 
distributed (Figure 12: Market value change histogram). Nevertheless, due to the high 
possibility of outliers, the analyses were also conducted after elimination of 7 outliers with a 
market value change of 1000% of more. The results were not significantly different, and thus 
are not reported in this paper. 
On average the firms made 6 acquisitions during the three year observation periods, with the 
most active firm making as many as 57 acquisitions – on average 19 acquisitions per year. 
The average proportion of acquisitions of divestitures during the moving three year 
observation period was 25.6% – about the same as the overall percentage of divestiture 
acquisitions in the sample. The summary statistics also confirm that acquisitions from 
distressed parents were very rare (average 2.8% during the observation period), as are 
competed acquisitions (0.8% of acquisitions). 
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Figure 12: Market value change histogram 
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5.3.2 Subsample analysis 
Similarly to the short-term models, first analysis of the panel model was done by dividing the 
sample into various subgroups and running two-sample t-tests on the dependent variable. 
The results of this analysis are summarized in table below (Table 9: Panel model subsample 
analysis). 
In the subsample analysis active divestiture acquirers were defined as firms with above-
average percentage of acquisitions divestitures during the observation period. Since 
acquisitions from public and especially distressed divestors were very rare, subgroups for 
these were defined as cases where the acquirer had bought at least one divestiture from a 
public and distressed parent during the observation period. 
When a firm‟s divestiture acquisition targets during the three-year period on average resulted 
in improved fit, measured as an average change in relatedness of more than 3, the 
observation was included in the improved fit subsample. Finally, strategic acquirers were 
tested as a distinct subgroup. 
The results in table 9 show that the long-term change in market value was around 32% 
higher for firms whose acquisitions during the past three years consisted of at least 25% 
divestiture acquisitions compared to firms with less than 25% divestiture acquisitions. This 
difference in the average market value change is statistically significant (p < 0.05), providing 
support for hypothesis 1. 
The results also strongly support hypotheses 4 and 5, since the change in market value is 
statistically significant and higher for strategic acquirers (37%; p < 0.05) and when the 
average relatedness of the divested unit improved in the acquisition process (78%; p < 0.01). 
The results show no significant difference in whether a divestiture was acquired from a 
public parent or not. Interestingly, however, there seems to be a negative effect if the 
divestiture acquisitions were acquired from a distressed public parent (-30%), although the 
result is only moderately significant (p < 0.1). Nevertheless, this result is in the opposite 
direction from hypothesized, contradicting hypothesis 3. 
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Table 9: Panel model subsample analysis 
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5.3.3 Pairwise correlations 
Pairwise correlations for the variables in the panel model are reported in the table below 
(Table 10: Panel models pairwise correlations). First variable is the dependent variable, 2 to 5 
are independent, and 6 to 14 are control variables. 
The correlations show that, similarly to the short-term model, the percentage of divestiture 
acquisitions exhibit highest correlation with the dependent variable. Also the average 
difference in relatedness correlates strongly with the long-term market value. In general, the 
correlations do not significantly differ from those of the short-term model. Also in the panel 
model, it seems that large acquirers and strategic acquirers bought on average more 
divestitures. 
The variables again show some multicollinearity, which may affect the results. However, the 
correlation coefficients are on average fairly low. Generally it is considered that if there are 
significant correlation coefficients above 0.8, multicollinearity may affect the results. 
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Table 10: Panel models pairwise correlations 
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5.3.4 Panel regression analysis 
Regression analyses of the long-term panel model were done using a random-effects 
regression with generalized least squares (GLS) estimation. The regression results are shown 
in table below (Table 11: Panel model regression results). In the table, models 1 to 4 use 
stepwise addition of new independent variables. 
Table 11: Panel model regression results 
Independent variable
Hypothesized 
direction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Percentage of divestiture acquisitions (3 yrs) + 0.968 1.034 1.136 0.871
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)***
Percentage of acquisitions with distressed parent (3 yrs) + -1.871 -1.893 -2.323
(0.028)** (0.026)** (0.004)***
Acquisitions with improved average relatedness (3 yrs) + 0.881 1.375
(0.033)** (0.001)***
Strategic acquirer + 1.004
(0.000)***
Amount of acquisitions (3 yrs) - -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.010
(0.507) (0.476) (0.431) (0.540)
Normalized standard deviation in acquisition rate (3 yrs) - -0.120 -0.117 0.053 0.226
(0.164) (0.172) (0.651) (0.054)*
Normalized acquirer total assets before window + -0.252 -0.263 -0.266 -0.294
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Percentage of international acquisitions (3 yrs) - -0.455 -0.561 -0.478 -0.632
(0.182) (0.101) (0.164) (0.049)**
Percentage of competed acquisitions (3 yrs) - 1.020 0.790 1.216 1.836
(0.524) (0.621) (0.448) (0.236)
Percentage of acquisitions with disclosed price (3 yrs) + 0.385 0.354 0.583 0.455
(0.168) (0.203) (0.051)* (0.102)
Percentage of public targets (3 yrs) - 0.006 0.292 0.346 0.415
(0.990) (0.510) (0.434) (0.326)
Percentage of acquisitions financed by cash + -0.434 -0.261 -0.274 -0.158
(0.338) (0.570) (0.549) (0.720)
Pre-2000 window ? -0.212 -0.239 -0.218 -0.350
(0.211) (0.157) (0.198) (0.028)**
Acquirer SIC 7371 ? -1.288 -1.234 -1.363 -1.187
(0.089)* (0.100) (0.073)* (0.030)**
Acquirer SIC 7372 ? -0.893 -0.903 -0.985 -0.902
(0.200) (0.190) (0.159) (0.065)*
Acquirer SIC 7373 ? -1.026 -1.050 -1.195 -0.859
(0.180) (0.165) (0.120) (0.125)
Acquirer SIC 7374 ? -0.467 -0.506 -0.621 -0.549
(0.509) (0.469) (0.383) (0.266)
Acquirer SIC 7375 ? -0.241 -0.253 -0.433 -0.188
(0.732) (0.717) (0.544) (0.706)
Acquirer SIC 7376 ? -0.354 -0.323 -0.479 -0.268
(0.627) (0.654) (0.515) (0.589)
Acquirer SIC 7379 ? -1.277 -1.323 -1.503 -0.974
(0.084)* (0.070)* (0.044)** (0.072)*
Constant ? 3.948 4.098 3.966 3.594
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Number of observations 434 434 434 434
NOTES:
Dependent variable: Percentage change in acquirer market value 3 years after window
P-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(SIC codes 7377 and 7378 dropped due to collinearity)
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Hypothesis 1 is strongly supported by all models. The percentage of divestiture acquisitions 
during past three years has a significantly positive effect on the acquirer‟s long-term market 
value, with a 1%-point increase in the amount of divestiture acquisitions corresponding to an 
approximate 1% increase in long-term market value (p < 0.01). 
Hypothesis 3 states that the performance of acquirers of divestitures is higher when the 
divesting parent has been financially distressed prior to the divestment. However, the results 
show that the effect in these cases is actually strongly negative. Thus, the results do not 
support hypothesis 3, but show an opposite effect to what was hypothesized. The possible 
reasons for this are discussed in the conclusions. 
When the acquisitions have on average resulted in improved fit between the target and 
acquirer, the long-term market value is affected positively (p < 0.05). This result strongly 
supports hypothesis 4. 
The results also show that the long-term change in market value is higher for strategic 
acquirers than ad hoc acquirers, supporting hypothesis 5. This indicates that companies 
which make acquisitions in a steady pace may perform better in the long run. Also 
noteworthy is that the short-term CAR of strategic acquirers was on average slightly negative 
(-0.17%), although not significantly different from zero. This discrepancy shows an 
interesting dilemma of acquisition performance: Multiple events that seemingly destroy value 
in the short term may actually have a positive effect on firm performance in the long run. 
Analysis of the control variables also reveals some interesting results. Firstly, the total 
amount of acquisitions during the window, and the standard deviation in acquisition rate 
both have a relatively small effect on long-term market value, and the effect is not statistically 
significant. These results are contrary to other findings (Laamanen and Keil, 2008). It is 
possible that in software industry the “indigestion effect” of acquisitions is smaller due to e.g. 
intangibility of majority of assets making them easier to move between organizations. It is 
also very likely that a majority of the acquisition targets are smaller than in many other 
industries, which also decreases the impact on market value change. Unfortunately, size of 
the targets could not be controlled in the models due to lack of publicly available data. 
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Also interestingly, acquirer size, measured as its normalized total assets prior to the three year 
moving window, has a negative effect on long-term market value. The finding indicates that 
acquisitions by large companies have a negative effect on market value compared to 
acquisitions by smaller firms. This corresponds to the results of the short-term CAR model 
in this paper, but is also contrary to the initial assumption. One possibility is that large firms 
on average acquirer larger targets, and pay more for these targets. 
Another possibility could be that for very large software firms, new acquisitions become 
more difficult to integrate due to e.g. the existing development processes. Another, 
somewhat more likely reason could be that the firms with initially high total assets are 
overvalued, and acquisitions by these firms results in decreased long-term value as the 
overvaluation is corrected. The problem is mainly induced by the choice of used variable, 
since total assets include also intangible assets such as goodwill, and in software industry 
these assets can comprise a major share of total assets. One possibility to check for this 
would be to use e.g. the amount of personnel as an alternative proxy for firm size and see if 
the results differ. Personnel size would omit the possibility of overvaluation, but also has 
other weaknesses, e.g. amount of personnel can differ depending on the firm‟s business 
model or degree of outsourcing. 
For acquisitions made prior to the year 2000, the long-term performance effect is negative 
and statistically significant in model 4. The outcome is most likely affected by the dot-com 
boom, since the majority of acquisitions undertaken during this era were in reality value-
negative, reflecting bad acquisition decisions. During the dot-com boom investors viewed 
nearly all high-tech acquisitions positively, as confirmed by the short-term CARs during the 
period (Uhlenbruch et al., 2006; Moeller et al., 2005), although their real effect on firm value 
was in fact negative. When this difference became evident, the market corrected itself, which 
shows as a negative long-term return. 
The only sub-industries with statistically significant effects on long-term acquisition 
performance are SICs 7371 and 7379, both showing significant negative long-term returns. 
However, the amount of companies included in the sample is small, and therefore the sub-
industry results might be affected by only one or two firms. Therefore, the only real 
conclusion that can be made from the sub-industry variables is that no industry seems to 
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exhibit significantly better performance than the other, since all industry coefficients are 
negative. 
5.3.5 Panel regression post-estimation 
Besides random effects estimation, panel models can be estimated using fixed effects. Fixed 
effects models are essentially stricter in terms of multicollinearity, but random effects models 
have generally better statistical significance. In general, fixed effects should be used if the 
results from these two are significantly different. To test for the feasibility of the random 
effects model versus fixed effects model, the Hausman test was used. The results show that 
the regression coefficients given by the random and fixed effects models are not different 
from each other (p < 0.01), and thus using the random effects model is justified. 
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6 Discussion and conclusions 
6.1 Summary of the results 
In this study the 5 hypotheses presented in chapter 3 were tested using two different 
regression model constructs. The short-term performance of individual acquisitions was 
studied using event study methodology (MacKinlay, 1997). In addition, the long-term 
performance of acquiring firms was studied by a panel model. Both models were tested using 
t-tests of means, and multivariate regression. In both cases the main focus was to study the 
contribution and effect of different variables to acquisition performance. The results are 
summarized in table below (Figure 12: Market value change histogram). 
Table 12: Summary of results 
Subgroup analysis
Regression 
analysis Subgroup analysis
Regression 
analysis
1
Divestiture acquisitions have above-average 
performance
Supported Supported Supported Supported
2
Low deal price of divestiture acquisitions 
improves acquirer performance
Not applicable Unsupported Not applicable Not applicable
3
Divesting parent's financial distress improves 
acquirer performance
Partially supported 
(very small sample)
Unsupported Opposite supported Opposite supported
4
Improvement of target relatedness improves 
acquirer performance
Supported Unsupported Supported Supported
5
Strategic acquirers have above-average 
performance
Unsupported Unsupported Supported Supported
Short-term CAR models Long-term panel models
Hypothesis
 
The first hypothesis regarding the above-average performance of divestiture acquisitions in 
general is also the base proposition of the whole study. It is supported by all analyses. Thus, 
divestiture acquisitions are shown to contribute positively both to the acquirer‟s short-term 
returns and long-term market value. 
The second hypothesis receives no support from the data. Descriptive analysis shows that on 
average divestiture acquisitions have lower price-to-sales ratios, but the actual value has no 
effect on acquirer performance. However, price-to-sales data was only available for a small 
segment of the total sample, which is a major shortfall regarding this analysis. For this reason 
the hypothesis also couldn‟t be tested by the panel models. 
Also analyses of the third hypothesis had a problem regarding data availability, since financial 
distress could only be determined for public divestors. The subgroup analysis of short-term 
Discussion and conclusions   
 
 
 
80 
returns supports the hypothesis, albeit with a sample size of only 30 observations which is 
too small to make any real inferences. 
What is interesting, though, is that the long-term models show an effect that is opposite to 
what was hypothesized. This indicates that buying divestitures from financially distressed 
firms affects the acquirer‟s long-term performance negatively. It is possible that this finding 
is also attributable to the small amount of observations. 
On the other hand, the result may also be entirely correct. The underlying proposition has 
two main issues: Price of the divestiture which should be lower when buying from a 
distressed parent, and performance of the divested unit or asset since improving asset 
efficiency should yield positive returns. Thus, it is possible that the price is in reality not 
lower, and/or the acquirer is unable to turn around a poorly performing unit. The effect can 
also be industry specific. In software industry most of a firm‟s assets are intangible (e.g. 
human resources), and turning around poor performance of these assets could be more 
difficult than with tangible resources. 
It would be interesting to study the performance of the divested target before and after the 
acquisition, and what was the actual cause of the parent‟s distress, i.e. was the distress caused 
by the divested unit or something entirely else. Also determining the transaction prices when 
the divesting parent is financially distressed would be important. However, data regarding the 
actual target is for the most part not publicly available, which prevents further study in this 
paper. Altogether more research on this subject would be required in order to make any solid 
conclusions. 
The fourth hypothesis is supported by most of the analyses. In the short-term model its 
effect is only partially supported, whereas in longer term it seems to have the strongest effect 
on the acquirer‟s market performance. Thus, the results strongly indicate that acquiring core-
related assets that are not strongly related to the divesting firm‟s business is highly profitable 
in the long run. 
Since the focal industry is the software industry, the above case essentially refers to a 
software company acquiring a non-software firm‟s software development unit or parts of it. 
In the software industry one key competence is software development capability. Since 
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software development and software engineering are also highly complex tasks, it is likely that 
these software capabilities are not as highly developed in the original non-software parent, 
and therefore the software development unit may have been inefficiently managed. 
On the other hand, the target may have various resources that are valuable to the acquirer, 
e.g. access to various resources, personnel, or strong knowledge of the parent‟s industry. The 
last is actually becoming more and more important as software firms increasingly customize 
their products to the needs of specific industries (vertical software) instead of offering a 
generalized product (horizontal software). Thus, the acquirer and target offer each other 
highly complementary resources. This kind of transfer of resources in both directions 
between the acquirer and target has been shown to improve post-acquisition performance 
(Capron and Pistre, 2002). 
Finally, hypothesis 5 is supported by the long-term models, but not by the short-term 
models. This indicates that strategic acquirers are able to outperform ad hoc acquirers in the 
long term. However, lack of support from the short-term model is can be expected, since a 
strategic acquirer makes acquisitions as part of a bigger plan and therefore it is very difficult 
to determine the value implication of a single acquisition in the program. As a metaphor, the 
acquisition program can be considered as a puzzle consisting of multiple pieces (i.e. 
acquisitions). By merely looking at a single piece of the puzzle one cannot really tell what the 
puzzle actually looks like. Furthermore, the results most likely also indicate that when 
considering individual acquisitions, investors can be unable to distinguish between 
acquisitions made by strategic and ad hoc acquirers. 
6.2 Limitations of the study 
6.2.1 Generalizability 
The largest limitations to generalizability stem from the scope of this study. First, the 
decision to include only a total of 60 acquirers that have made 10 or more acquisition during 
the observation period was rather arbitrary. Therefore, the results are directly applicable only 
to very active acquirers, although this is justifiable since the overall focus in the first place 
was to concentrate on this group of firms. Especially the methodology used in the long-term 
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acquisition program perspective became meaningful only after a suitable amount of 
acquisitions were made by the focal firms. 
The decision to limit the amount of acquirers in the sample may also affect the results 
through selection bias. That is, because the included sample is non-randomly selected from 
the whole population, also the generalizability of the results is limited. 
Another limitation is the inclusion of acquisitions made only by public US based companies 
in the sample. This was necessary in order to ensure data availability, but does create a 
limitation in applying the results also to private firms, and companies outside the US. For 
example, the economic and regulatory environments of different nations might affect the 
studied issues. 
Thirdly, the focal industry under study was software industry, and thus the findings are 
directly applicable only to acquirers in that industry. This mitigates the potential confounding 
effect of uncontrolled cross-industry differences, but also limits the study‟s external validity. 
It is also possible that especially in software industry the periods 1999-2000 may bias the 
results, even though this period was controlled to some degree. 
6.2.2 Methodology 
The triangulation by using two different and complementary methodologies – short-term 
cumulative abnormal returns (event study) and long-term market value change – increases 
the general credibility of the findings. However, both methodologies also have certain 
potential limitations. 
First of all, the event study methodology assumes that investors are able to correctly assess 
the value implications of an event (in this case an acquisition) in a relatively short amount of 
time. However, as argued in chapter 4.4, this proposition might not always hold true. This is 
also indicated by the findings in this paper, which show that short-term returns to strategic 
acquirers are not significantly different from zero, although the long-term effect is 
significantly positive. 
On the other hand, similarly to the study by Laamanen and Keil (2008), the long-term 
models cannot unambiguously show causality between the studied phenomena. That is, the 
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superior performance of certain companies might be due to some entirely unobserved 
factors instead of the suggested, e.g. simply a better overall strategy. This problem is 
exacerbated by the relatively small amount of 60 firms included in the study. 
6.2.3 Variables 
The included variables may cause some bias in the results. Relatedness is an issue that is 
shown to be exceptionally hard to operationalize. The measure used in this study calculates 
similarity based on the industries where the firms operate. However, the fact that two 
companies operate in the software industry does not necessitate similarity between the firms, 
since they might possess very different resource bases, management styles, corporate cultures 
or corporate strategies. However, industry-based classification has been used extensively in 
the past, and has also been shown to be a relatively good measure on a high level of 
abstraction. SIC codes also provide an unambiguous, standardized, and easily available 
measure. 
On the other hand, SIC codes are also a fairly old classification scheme. Therefore, it is 
possible that the classification of relatively new industries – such as the software industry – is 
not entirely accurate, although the classification is used also in many previous studies. 
Acquirer‟s total assets were used as a proxy for acquirer size. In hindsight, the construct 
validity of this variable can be somewhat lacking, inflicting a bias in the results. The problem, 
as discussed earlier, is that total assets include also intangible assets. In software companies 
intangible assets commonly constitute a major part of total assets, and especially during the 
dot-com boom these assets were extremely overvalued. Therefore, total assets may not be 
the best possible proxy for firm size in software industry, and in further studies also 
alternative variables to measure firm size should be examined. 
Another variable that could be examined in more detail is the one for parent distress, and 
this along with small sample size might be one cause for the lack of support for the third 
hypothesis. This study measured distress as the change in a company‟s net income and return 
on invested capital, and defined distressed companies as those who had a two-year 
consecutive decline in both, or when both were negative for two previous years. However, 
although it measures operational distress, this might not be a valid indicator for financially 
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constrained firms. Therefore, in further studies other measures should be tested as well. For 
example, a simultaneously low level of current ratio and high level of leverage ratio (e.g. debt-
to-equity) would probably better measure the firm‟s financial situation. 
Lack of data also presented a major problem, which affected testing two of the hypotheses. 
The main dilemma is that in a large-scale empirical study one has to make a trade-off 
between the marginal benefit of adding more accurate data, and the marginal cost of data 
extraction. In this case, adding more data would have required a tremendous effort since 
most of the data is private to the companies making the acquisitions, which were also usually 
undertaken many years ago. Dropping the missing data out of the study is a big limitation 
and creates a bias. However, in order to study the phenomena in question more thoroughly, 
another type of research setting is needed (e.g. survey method). 
Finally, it is also possible that some relevant variables were left out of the research model. 
This may have an effect on the results, since these uncontrolled factors may be important 
explanatory variables, and their effect might be transferred to other included variables. In 
most cases the omission of variables was due to unavailability of data. For private firms and 
divestitures most of the required data is simply not available (e.g. transaction price is often 
kept confident), and obtaining this data is usually nigh impossible. 
6.3 Implications and further research 
6.3.1 Implications for practitioners 
For managers in software firms this study gives some perspective on what kinds of 
acquisitions are more profitable. In general it shows that, when possible, acquisitions of 
divestitures should be considered as a viable alternative. This is especially true when the 
target is a software unit of a non-software company. Firms in other industries will most likely 
benefit from divestiture acquisitions similarly, but in these cases the managers should also 
include their own judgment regarding factors specific to their industry. 
At the same time this study asserts the oft-cited advice to analyze any acquisition and the 
motives behind it thoroughly before making one. If not well planned and executed, 
divestiture acquisitions are just as prone to destroy value as are other acquisitions. 
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Similarly to recent research on acquisition programs, this paper departs to some extent from 
the prevailing view of considering acquisitions as individual phenomena. Instead, it suggests 
that acquisitions should be viewed in a more long-term scope, and they should be more 
closely linked to the firm‟s overall strategic plan and behavior. 
6.3.2 Implications for research 
This study contributes significantly to the scientific body of knowledge. One of the most 
elusive topics in M&A research has traditionally concerned the factors that drive acquisition 
success. In a way, it seems that researchers have generally been looking at the wrong set of 
descriptors. 
First of all, the majority of extant research attempts to find factors that are generalizable 
across industries and firms. However, it seems that by far stronger predictors are related to 
the choice of acquisition target. This was in part shown by Capron and Shen (2007) for 
private firms as acquisition targets, and now similarly for divestiture targets. Therefore, 
researchers should pay much closer attention to various subsets within the whole bulk of 
acquisitions, instead of over-generalizing. Also aggregation over industries should be 
considered more closely. It seems that in reality acquisitions, and consequently their success 
factors, are a much more heterogenic set than previously thought.  
However, much more research is needed, both in identifying these various subsets, and in 
acquisitions of divestitures alone. Firstly, the effect of parent distress was left fairly 
ambiguous in this study. Furthermore, other underlying factors should be studied in order to 
better understand the dynamics of divestiture acquisitions. For example, how does the 
motivation to divest actually affect the deal process, acquisition price, etc.? Are there major 
differences in post-acquisition integration of divestitures compared to “regular” acquisitions? 
For example, divestments first have to be dis-integrated from the parent both 
organizationally as well as legally, and this may have significant effects on long-term 
performance. Also an interesting area of study would be the transfer of resources between 
the acquirer and the divestiture target, how these resources complement each other, and how 
this translates to acquirer performance. 
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Another shortcoming of a lot of existing studies is that they almost invariantly focus on 
single acquisitions, and disregard any interdependency between these individual acquisitions. 
The emerging view of strategic acquisition programs, however, shows that although 
individual acquisitions may create negative returns, their long term contribution might be 
significantly positive and therefore a very valid strategy. 
Also the propensity of existing studies to use the event study methodology alone to assess 
acquisition performance can be criticized. An event study measures the short-term opinion 
of investors, nothing more and nothing less. However, as this study shows, the value 
contribution of some factors is only visible in the long term. Therefore, more variability in 
acquisition research methodology is called for. 
The acquisition program perspective is fairly new, and as suggested by Laamanen and Keil 
(2008), a lot more is to be researched. Regarding the topic of this study, the most interesting 
and also extensive research area would be to integrate research in the three interrelated topics 
– diversification, acquisitions, and divestments – and extend the acquisition program 
perspective into a comprehensive „portfolio reconfiguring program‟ framework. 
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